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INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS
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PRCtcis

T

HE dichotomy that emerged from the debate over the United States'
invasion of Iraq, pitting multilateralism against unilateralism, has generally obscured more than it has enlightened about the law, rationales and
effectiveness of multilateralism in war. This Article examines "security
multilateralism" and concludes that, while the authority to address peace
and security is, as a matter of international law, aggregated at the Security
Council, the functions through which the United Nations works in support of that aggregated legal mandate are dispersed throughout the organization and affiliated bodies. Inquiries that seek to measure the
effectiveness of U.N. security multilateralism against other multilateral or
unilateral actors in armed conflict need to take this dispersal of functions
into account.
This Article proposes a taxonomy of security multilateralism formed
by these disaggregated functions: (1) assessment, (2) intermediation, (3)
humanitarian assistance, (4) sanctions, (5) military intervention and (6)
post-conflict administration. In this Article, the taxonomy is applied to
three cases that represent the spectrum of legality of outside interventions
in war: U.N. multilateral (East Timor); ad hoc, non-U.N. multilateral (Kosovo); and unilateral (Iraq). This comparative empirical examination
reveals the ways in which U.N. multilateralism may be over-valued (e.g.,
the U.N.'s legitimating effect on outside military interventions), undervalued (e.g., the U.N.'s ability to assess threats and impose sanctions) or
misconstrued (e.g., U.N. military operations may be no more or less multinational than a non-U.N. operation). The Article concludes with implications for reform of U.N. security functions and recommendations for
how the taxonomy might be applied to future research.
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MULTILATERALISM AND WAR

From the beginning, America has sought international support
for our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and we have gained

much support. There is a difference, however, between leading a
coalition of many nations, and submitting to the objections of a
few. America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country.
Had we failed to act, Security Council resolutions on Iraq would
have been revealed as empty threats, weakening the United Nations and encouraging defiance by dictators around the world.1

INTRODUCTION

In the run up to invasion of Iraq in March 2003, opinion in the
United States divided roughly into two camps: those who supported the
invasion, regardless of whether it was sanctioned by the United Nations,
and those who opposed the invasion unless it was sanctioned by the United

Nations. The dichotomy pitted unilateralism against multilateralism. Either the United States would act regardless of legal support from the Security Council, or it would act only with legal support from the U.N. and as
part of a multilateral operation with broad international support. 2 This
divide between unilateralism and multilateralism marked the contours of
the debate about the rationale for war, 3 the appropriate role of the U.N.
in post-conflict reconstruction 4 and the internationalization of the troops
on the ground.

5

1. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.
2. A few voices tried to bridge the gap. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Good Reasons for GoingAround the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at A33 (arguing that war
might be legitimate-even if illegal-if WMDs were found and Iraqi people welcomed U.S. occupation and post-conflict phase was internationalized). But see,
Anne-Marie Slaughter, President'sMessage, NEWSL. (Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law) Apr.
2004 (concluding, one year after invasion that "the war was illegal and
illegitimate").
3. See, e.g., EJ. Dionne, Jr., Voices That Must Be Heard, WASH. POST, Oct. 8,
2002, at A25; Dana Milbank, With Congress Aboard, Bush Targets a Doubtful Public,
WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2002, at A21.
4. See, e.g., Warren Hoge, The Conflict in Iraq: Diplomacy; US and U.N. Are Once
Again the Odd Couple over Iraq, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 2004, § 1, at 15; see also Anthony
Lake & Eric P. Schwartz, Editorial, Tough Decisions on Who Will Govern PostwarIraq,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 6, 2003, at CII (arguing importance of national interests in
sharing cost of responsibilities in postwar governance and humanitarian relief of
Iraqi people).
5. See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, United States Puts a Spin on Coalition Numbers, WASH.
POST, Mar. 21, 2003, at A29; see also Ivo Daadler, Bush's Coalition Doesn't Add Up
Where It Counts, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Mar. 24, 2003, at A16 (criticizing Bush administration's contention that war against Iraq has growing international support).
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The unilateralists cited the rationales articulated in the Bush administration's National Security Strategy ("NSS") as support for a policy that
seeks to pursue U.S. national interests aggressively-unconstrained by any
pre-existing commitments under international agreements. 6 The administration's early abandonment of the Kyoto Protocol 7 and the International

Criminal Court 8 were signals that the NSS would form the core of Bush
administration policies and its relationship to multilateral institutions.9
After the attacks of 9/11, some argued that the nature of the ongoing
terrorist threats would demand a more multilateralist approach; and for a
time, that appeared to happen. The United States sought and obtained
Security Council authority for a range of measures to combat the global Al
Qaeda terrorist network. These measures did not, however, signal a return to the broad multilateralism in security matters that had marked the
1990s. 10
Opposing arguments put forward by the multilateralists relied, in
large part, on the legal requirement under the U.N. Charter that the use
of force is prohibited, except where authorized by the Security Council or
in self-defense. If the threat from the Iraqi regime was to be reduced or
eliminated, it should be done with the imprimatur of the "international
community," that is, through multilateral institutions."1
6.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

(Sept. 2002), available

at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf ("The U.S. National Security Strategy
will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of
our values and our national interests.").
7. Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Feb. 16, 2005, 37 I.L.M. 32.

8. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998)
(entered into force July 1, 2002). On May 6, 2002, the United States formally
informed the United Nations that it did not intend to become a party to the Rome
Statute. See Diane F. Orentlicher, UnilateralMultilateralism: United States Policy Towards the International Criminal Court, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 415, 416 (2004)

("United States opposition to the International Criminal Court... is widely seen as
a manifestation of America's deeper-and-growing antipathy toward multilateral institutions."); see also Letter from John Bolton, Under Secretary of State, to Secretary General Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002) (on file with author).
9. See, e.g., Gareth Evans, The U.S. Versus the World? How American Power Seems
to the Rest of Us, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD Ari. 99, 102-03 (2003); Ian Johnstone, The
U.S.-U.N. Relations After Iraq: The End of the World (Order) as We Know It?, 15 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 813, 826-27 (2004).
10. Because the U.S. military operation against the Taliban was considered to
be an act of self-defense, no explicit authorization by the Security Council was
required. See Derek Jinks, State Responsibility for Terrorist and Insurgent Groups: State
Responsibility for Acts of Private Armed Groups, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 83, 84-87 (2003)
(explaining United States' self-defense claim). The coordination of financial sanctions and other measures taken against the Taliban regime, however, was done
through the Security Council. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc S/
RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc S/RES/1368
(Sept. 12, 2001).
11. See Thomas M. Franck, What HappensNow? The United Nations After Iraq,97
AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 609 (2003) (noting Security Council's effectiveness in interpreting and applying rules to enhance responsiveness to terrorism); Thomas L.
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The arguments of the unilateralists and multilateralists were largely
normative and revolved around the question of what international law requires: Does the law permit the United States to act alone, or is the United
States required to act only through some form of multilateral institution?
Absent largely from the public debate was whether one or the form of
intervention would be more effective in bringing about the shared goal of
reducing threats to international peace and security.1 2 It is that question
of effectiveness of the form of intervention to prevent, reduce or end war
that this Article seeks to address.
International legal scholars have traditionally assumed that multilateralism, like law, matters. In contrast, realist international relations scholars
traditionally argue that multilateralism, like law, does not matter, or at
least that it does not matter much. 13 In recent years, international law
scholarship has begun to take a critical look at multilateralism from a variety of theoretical perspectives beyond legal doctrine. 14 At the same time,
rational institutionalists of international relations are moving closer to international law scholars in recognizing that while multilateralism cannot
be accepted uncritically as promoting peace and the rule of law, it does
alter the behavior of international actors. The challenge to international
legal scholars has been how to prove or disprove the claim that multilateralism reduces incidents of war or limits war's destructiveness. In order to
be able to test the unilateralist rationales of those who tout "benign impeFriedman, Present at... What?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2003, at A37 (arguing necessity
of complete international legitimacy and acceptance in United States' dealings
with Iraq). But see William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and
InternationalLaw, 97 AM.J. INT'L L. 557, 557 (2003) (arguing legality of Operation
Iraqi Freedom).
12. I use the term "shared" cautiously. The Bush administration's stated rationale-at least at the time of the invasion-was justified on the threat Iraq posed as
a result of its unlawful retention of banned weapons and ongoing weapons program. At the time of the invasion, the assumption that Iraq was, in fact, not fully
complying with U.N. inspections requirements was shared by many of the individual and state opponents of the invasion.
13. By calling law "epiphenomenal," realists allow themselves to concede that
law may make a difference to international relations, but that difference is negligible. For a discussion of this difference, see infra notes 42, 46 and accompanying
text.
14. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERic A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 8 (2005) ("International law emerges from states acting rationally to
maximize their interests given their perceptions of the interests of other states and
the distribution of state power."); Jose Alvarez, Multilateralismand Its Discontents, 11
EUR. J. INT'L L. 393 (2000); Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning
Landmines, the Role of InternationalNon-Governmental Organizationsand the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 91, 109-10 (2000); Allan Gerson, Multilateralism d la Carte: The Consequences of Unilateral "Pickand Pay" Approaches, 11 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 61 (2000); Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International
Law, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1823, 1840-41 (2002) (adopting repeated-game model of state
behavior to demonstrate effect of international law on compliance); see also Oona
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002)
(providing empirical examination of compliance with international human rights
treaties).
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rialism" through "humanitarian unilateralism,"' 15 against those who are
unqualified supporters of preserving post-World War II multilateralism
through the United Nations, the analysis needs to start with a working
definition and thick description of what we mean by multilateralism in the
security context.
Multilateralism in war, or "security multilateralism," is the coordination of security relations among states according to the principles and legal norms governing the use of force. 1 6 The power of the U.N. to address
armed conflict and maintain just peace is, as a matter of Charter law, aggregated at the Security Council. But, the functions through which the U.N.
organization works in support of that aggregated legal mandate are, however, dispersed and carried out by many bodies. These functions include:
(1) assessment, (2) intermediation, (3) humanitarian assistance, (4) sanctions, (5) military intervention and (6) post-conflict administration. Empirical studies of security multilateralism should take into account the ways
in which the U.N. has carried out these disaggregated functions, and the
extent to which non-U.N. actors can carry out the same functions without
U.N. participation. An overly narrow focus on decisions taken at the
Council, acting in support of the military intervention function, ignores
and risks marginalizing the importance and effectiveness of the other
functions in addressing threats to international peace and security.
This Article examines two past conflicts-East Timor and Kosovoand compares them with the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Viewing these three
conflicts through the taxonomy of these six institutional functions of multilateralism reveals useful information about how these dispersed functions are actually carried out.
This Article quite intentionally leaves aside the separate, but important, question of what the rules of multilateralism in armed conflict should
be. The limited project here is to provide a framework for considering the
relative effectiveness of different forms of addressing armed conflict in the
three different contexts represented by East Timor, Kosovo and Iraq: U.N.
multilateral, ad hoc multilateral and unilateral. I do not mean to minimize the important long-term systemic effects of the content of the international rules. Rather, I hope to inform debate over reform of the rules
governing how and when armed force may be used by refining a tool with
which to evaluate the effectiveness of different forms of institutional ac15. See NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE PRICE OF AMERICA'S EMPIRE 5 (2004)
(quoting Robert Kaplan's view that American imperialism can be viewed as "benign form of order"); see also Max Boot, The Casefor American Empire, WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 15, 2001, at 27 (calling for expansion of goals and more assertive
approach to implementing America's response to terrorism); Emily Eakin, Pax
American-The Casefor an American Empire, COLUM. ST., Apr. 7, 2002, at D1 (arguing
America is not mere superpower or hegemon, but empire).
16. I borrow here from John Ruggie's definition of multilateralism. John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism:the Anatomy of an Institution, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND PRAXIS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FoRM 3, 8-14 (John Gerard
Ruggie ed., 1992) [hereinafter MULTiLATERALISM MATTERS].
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tion in armed conflict, even-or especially-those actions that are unlawful under the current rules. Further, my hope is that by providing a
framework through which to draw on the empirical case studies being
done by political scientists, international lawyers can become more informed about the context in which rulemaking takes place.
The project here is largely positive, describing the role of multilateral
institutions in each case and the extent to which U.N. multilateralism differed from, or was more or less effective than, non-U.N. efforts. In each of
these cases, arguments were put forward that participation by outside parties (unilateral, regional or U.N.-based) was justified under international
legal norms. I do not intend to wade into those debates, except to the
extent that those justifications included arguments based on efficacy of
17
the form of intervention.
Part One of this Article examines accounts of multilateralism in international law and international relations and analyzes the historical and
legal foundations of U.N. security multilateralism. It concludes that, while
the legal authority over security multilateralism is aggregated at the Security Council, the functions of security multilateralism are dispersed throughout the U.N. and affiliated organizations and argues that these functions
should be viewed as subordinate to the Council. Part Two presents the
disaggregation of security multilateralism into a taxonomy of these dispersed functions: (1) assessment, (2) intermediation, (3) humanitarian assistance, (4) sanctions, (5) military intervention and (6) post-conflict
administration. Part Three applies the taxonomy to the three armed conflicts that range along a continuum of legality from U.N. multilateral (East
Timor) to non-U.N. multilateral (Kosovo) to unilateral (Iraq). Part Three
examines these conflicts through the taxonomy of functions and makes
some preliminary observations about security multilateralism that reveal
the ways in which the U.N. has been overvalued (the U.N. may not have a
strong legitimating effect on outside military interventions), under-valued
(the U.N. may have effective capacity to assess threats and impose sanctions) or misconstrued (U.N. military interventions may be no more or
less multinational than non-U.N. operations). The Article concludes with
potential implications for reform of U.N. security functions and recommendations for how the taxonomy might be applied to future research.
I.

MULTILATERALISM IN ARMED CONFLICr

The terms "multilateral" and "unilateral" have become verbal hand
grenades in the current discourse on international relations and war in
the United States and Europe, and as such are tossed around with great
imprecision by pundits and the popular press.' 8 One example is the way
17. For a discussion of the relative merits of UN and non-UN military interventions, see infra notes 285-314 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Patrick Tyler, A Nation at War: The Attack; U.S. and British Troops
Push into Iraq as Missiles Strike Baghdad Compound, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2003, at Al.
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in which even some prominent legal academics have been accused of
near-zealotry in their promotion of multilateral solutions to international
security problems. 19 For international law skeptics in and out of the academy, "multilateralism" takes on almost pejorative overtones; representing
anti-democratic decision making that allows outside states to "veto" actions
taken to protect the United States' national interests. 2 0 But the central
claim of both unilateralists and multilateralists is that their approach will
promote long-term stability and peace.
"Security multilateralism" 2 1 is distinct from two other forms of security relationships between states: "security bilateralism" and "security unilateralism." Bilateralism refers to reciprocal arrangements between two
states, generally understood to produce mutual benefits and rights and
incur mutual obligations. 22 Unilateralism generally refers to actions that
Complicating the discussion further, in Europe, multilateralism takes on a broader
meaning that encompasses not only the process of transnational cooperation, but
also the more "supranational" elements of centralized rule-making in the European Union. Multilateralism within Europe has been internalized as a legitimate
means for legislating national policy. Because European states accept multilateralism as descriptive of both these accepted processes and norms, multilateralism is a
less polarizing notion. See, e.g., Joachim Krause, Multilateralism:Behind European
Views, WASH. Q., Spring 2004. Krause notes that the European view is not monolithic, but includes three strands-German, French and British-that see multilateralism and collective security respectively as: (1) a good in itself in that it
promotes international law and diplomacy over war, (2) effective and necessary
only insofar as it can be used to assert French interests or counteract the hegemon
and (3) as an instrument to be used when practicable and effective, and to be
ignored when not.
19. One example of the polemics involved with the mere use of the term
'multilateral" was a discussion on the Charlie Rose show in December 2002, involving Harold Koh, Christopher Hitchens, David Rieff and Michael Walzer. See The
Charlie Rose Show (PBS television broadcast Dec. 12, 2002). In a subsequent article
about the experience, Hitchens noted that Koh "must have pronounced the words
'multilateral' or 'multilateralism' several dozen times." Christopher Hitchens,
Multilateralism and Unilateralism: A Self-Canceling Complaint, Dec. 18, 2002, http://
www.slate.com/id/2075659. In fact, Koh only used the term "multilateral" seven
times. See The Charlie Rose Show, supra. Despite his inaccurate recall, Hitchens
points out the setf-canceling-at least in linguistic terms-complaint of those in
the British labor party who in 2002 decried the Bush "regime change" policy not
unwise per se, but unwise merely because it was "unilateral" and not "multilateral."
To convert a policy that is "unilateral" (using the dictionary definition of "onesided") into one that is "multilateral" ("many sided") would only require that the
opponents of the policy join in. Id.
20. See, e.g.,John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, I CHI.
J. INT'L L. 205, 208-09 (2000); see also David E. Sanger, A Doctrine Under Pressure:Preemption Is Redefined, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, at A1O (discussing Democratic candidate John Kerry's proposal to use "global test" when dealing with questions of national security).
21. I use the term "security multilateralism" to distinguish it from trade and
economic multilateralism.
22. Over time, a large number of bilateral agreements, for example the web
of bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") may come to resemble a multilateral system, but are reflective of the bilateral dynamic. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Gregory
W. Bowman, Economic Integration in the Americas: "A Work in Progress", 14 Nw. J. INT'L
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affect the welfare and well being of one or more other states taken by one
state alone and without prior coordination or cooperation with outside
states. 23 In the security context, unilateralism is frequently used to describe the use of aggressive force or other forms of "self-help" through
violent means. 24 Security multilateralism refers to the institutions and
process of addressing armed conflict through cooperation and coordination of larger groups of states.2 5 Theories of why states cooperate with one
another or coordinate their actions in the face of armed conflict help explain the rationales for existing multilateral security arrangements.
A.

Systematizing Security Multilateralism

Efforts to systematize and evaluate security multilateralism have
emerged along two separate tracks: normative and doctrinal explanations
of the law governing international security multilateralism and explanations of U.N. multilateralism as a political phenomenon. 26 The Security
L. & Bus. 493, 510-11 (1994) (explaining complexities and problems that arise
with having complete network of bilateral agreements among nations). In the defense and security context, a paradigmatic example is the mutual defense agreement. See, e.g., Mutual Security Treaty, U.S.-Japan, Jan. 18, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632;
Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S.-S. Korea, Oct. 1, 1953, 5 U.S.T. 2368; Mutual Defense
Treaty, U.S.-Phil., Aug. 30, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3950.
23. See Pascal Boniface, The Specter of Unilateralism,WASH. Q. Summer 2001,
155, 158-59 (discussing U.S. unilateralism, unilateralist policies and European reaction to such policies). The Oxford English Dictionary defines "unilateral" as
"the pursuit of a foreign policy without allies or irrespective of their views." OxFORD ENGLISH

DICTIONARY,

available at http://www.oed.com (citing

HENRY

KIS-

WHITE HOUSE YEARS 1089 (1979)) ("From an early hostility to the
American alliance with Japan . . . the Chinese leader soon came to view it as a
guarantee of America's interest in the Western Pacific and a rein on Japanese
unilateralism.").
24. If a state acts alone in deploying force, but does so either with the approval of the U.N. Security Council or under the international rules governing selfdefense, it is generally not considered "unilateral," as a normative matter, despite
the fact that it is descriptively unilateral. For a further discussion, see infra notes
114-119 and accompanying text.
25. Cooperation is required where states refrain from actions that "would otherwise be in their immediate self-interest in order to reap larger medium- or longterm benefits." GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 14, at 12. Coordination appears
in interstate relations where "states receive higher payoffs if they engage in identical or symmetrical actions than if they do not." Id. The classic example of coordination is where a uniform solution to a technology problem is required (width of a
railway gage, for example) but each state is indifferent to the outcome. Coordination in the security context is required for standardization of equipment and rules
of engagement and other aspects of operations composed of troops from two or
more nations.
26. For an excellent summary of the division between international law and
international relations, see OONA HATHAWAY & HAROLD KOH, FOUNDATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 1-3 (2004) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLITICS]. See Oona Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:An Integrated Theoy of
InternationalLaw, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 475-76 (2005) [hereinafter Between Power
and Principle]. The apparent insularity of international law from the core concerns
of legal scholarship has marginalized international law scholars within law schools
SINGER,
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Council is placed at the center of most legal analysis of security multilateralism because of the authority committed to the Council under the U.N.
Charter.2 7 In most respects, these accounts analyze U.N. security multilateralism in its aggregate form, focusing on the decisions of the Council
when it acts in its enforcement capacity. The role of the subordinate U.N.
organs and related agencies in the area of armed conflict tends to be
marginalized or minimized as a result. Nevertheless, these accounts of the
rationales for multilateralism that can be included as a means of testing
the relative effectiveness of multilateral and non-multilateral approaches.
1.

Legitimacy and Fairness

The legitimacy and fairness school argues that the United Nations itself, through the law of the Charter, legitimates any action taken by the
U.N. member states to regulate the use of force, including decisions to
approve counter-force. According to Thomas Franck, the legal requirement of Council authorization in the case of all non-defensive use of force
confers legitimacy, a legitimacy derived from the universality of membership of the United Nations and of the norms in the Charter. 28 This legitimacy is therefore both procedural and substantive. Because membership
is an expression of state sovereignty of the member state, that sovereignty
confers on the collective group decisions of the U.N. the political legitimacy of each individual sovereign act.29 Each sovereign act in turn is the
result of political accountability of each member state to its domestic conas well. Id. at 476. While these tracks have largely remained parallel, in recent
years there have been increasing efforts to import the insights of international
relations into legal scholarship. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, supra;
Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A
New Generation of Inter-DisciplinaryScholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998).
27. See, e.g., Jose Alvarez, Hegemonic InternationalLaw Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 873, 874 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377 (1994).
28. SeeTHOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990)
(defining legitimacy as "a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself
exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those
addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in
accordance with generally accepted principles of right process").
29. Indeed, it is on the broad measure of universality that the U.N. has also
improved upon the League structure. All states are members of the United Nations General Assembly and therefore have the right to participate in its core func-

tions. All member states thus derive benefits from and incur obligations under
each of the functions carried out in the area of peace and security. See THOMAS
FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION 187 (1985) [hereinafter NATION AGAINST NA(discussing reciprocity between member states); see also THOMAS FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE (2002) [hereinafter RECOURSE TO FORCE]; DEMOCRATIC
ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002) (Charlotte
Ku & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 2002) [hereinafter ACcouNTABILITY]; MarianoForentina Cuellar, Reflections on Sovereignty and Collective Security, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L.
211, 221 n.49 (2004) (discussing sovereignty-based collective security). Of course,
not all member states are democratic or legitimate, which has created the so-called
"democracy deficit" in the U.N. and other multilateral organizations.
TION]
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stituencies, which further enhances the legitimacy of the U.N.'s actions.3 0
This perspective has been particularly valuable to understanding procedu31
ral norms, for example: the political nature of Council decision-making,
efforts to reform voting procedures3 2 and expansion of Council
33
membership.
Further, the U.N. facilitates collective action by permitting a group of
nations to address security threats in a way each state could not do acting
alone, 3 4 conferring on the process a neutral character; it is at once the
decision of all the international community and the decision of no state in
particular. 35 This neutrality, in turn, brings about better, more just results
than those that would be achieved through non-neutral, unilateral or ad
hoc self-help. 36 The combination of legitimacy and neutrality carries long30. An alternative perspective views supranational power as less legitimate.
See Michael Glennon, The United States, Democracy Hegemony, & Accountability, in AcCOUNTABILITY, supra note 29. Accountability of member state actions through
transnational constituencies, including so-called "CNN legitimacy," plays a separate
role from that of sovereign legitimacy. See, e.g., David Kennedy, Tom Franck and the
Manhattan School, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 397 (2003). This rooting of legitimacy of the Council in domestic law is part of the larger effort in international law
to explain legitimacy of international rule making as derived from integration with
the domestic legal order, either directly or through transnational networks. See,
e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 266-71 (2003) (arguing that

sub-national governmental units can operate through transnational networks without giving up sovereignty); Harold Koh, BringingInternationalLaw Home, 35 Hous.
L. REv. 623 (1998).
31. For a general discussion of domestic political influences on Security
Council member behavior, see AccoUNTABImITv, supra note 29.
32. See Gabriella Venturini, Italy and the United Nations: Membership, Contribution and Proposalsfor Reform, 20 HAMLINE L. REv. 627, 634 (1997).
33. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Roberts, United Nations Security Council Resolution 687
and Its Aftermath, 25 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 593, 620 (1993). Other work focusing on the substantive norms of security multilateralism (i.e., the prohibition of
the use of force and the exceptions thereto) has contributed to understanding
whether the rules themselves have ongoing viability in light of the relative desuetude of the Council during the Cold War and the persistence of armed conflict
throughout the same period. See Glennon, supra note 30.
34. That is, the U.N. finances and delegates authority to international organizations with specialized expertise and ability to carry out certain missions in the
context of war. The Military Committee was to be the ultimate military capacity of
the international community. Absent the standing Military Committee, other organizations carry out specialized missions in the context of war. See, e.g., Statute of
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428,
U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 325 plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Dec. 14, 1950). For a
further discussion of taxonomy functions, see infra notes 137-94 and accompanying text.
35. See NATION AGAINST NATION, supra note 29, at 99 (1985) (noting decision
to make U.N. separate legal identity from its constituent states).
36. One view is that the U.N. has been effective in not taking political sides,
or at least that, when the U.N. does weigh in on one or another side of a dispute, it
does so in the interest of peace and security and not in terms of political preferences. This view holds that because it represents the will of the international community, and because it embodies the central international human rights
instruments and organs, any result obtained under the auspices of the U.N. will at
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term systemic benefits by reinforcing the notion that rules, not pure
power, govern the relations between states.
2.

Realism

The realist view has traditionally rejected the importance of the
norms and process governing Security Council enforcement mechanisms,
just as it rejects international institutions generally.3 7 Instead, realists argue that U.N. enforcement mechanisms are at best a reflection of rational
state action in an anarchical international system governed by power politics. 3 8 The very composition of the Council, including the veto for the
permanent five, reflects rational calculations by states aimed at aggrandizing power and maximizing security. 39 More powerful states will access the
Security Council when it serves their interest to do so and will disregard it
when it does not.40 Less powerful states make similar calculations, allying
with powerful states and joining institutions when the benefits outweigh
the costs. 41 To the extent that law exists, it is "epiphenomenal" to what
really happens in the world system. 42 Under this view, any multilateral
mechanism aimed at providing for collective security is therefore not too
43
different, in practice, from alliances that balance power and security.
least be more 'just" than that obtained by "interested" third parties. See generally
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1998)
[hereinafter FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW].
37. The seminal realist work is HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONs: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (1973), in which he sets out the thesis
that " [i]nternational politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the
ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim." Id. at
27; see also Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and InternationalLaw, 34
AM. J. INT'L L. 260 (1940).
38. To a rational state, collective security multilateralism would be assessed in
policy terms in much the same way alliances were assessed. A state should enter
into a multilateral security arrangement if the benefits to that state outweigh the
costs. SeeJohn J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of InternationalInstitutions, 19 INT'L
SECURITY 3 (1995) (arguing there is little value in international institutions and
multilateralism has little impact on state behavior). Rationalism in the sphere of
security relationships is complicated to a certain degree by distinctions between
comparative and absolute gains and the problem of cheating. Id. at 13.
39. Kenneth Waltz amended Morgethau's view of states as motivated solely by
the aggrandizement of power to include the "subdued optimism" of the belief that
states are "motivated by the desire for security." Mearsheimer, supra note 38, at 48
n.180; see also KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 126 (1979)

(arguing security ranks top priority for states within anarchic system).
40. See MORGENTHAU, supra note 37, at 29 ("[States] may also try to further
[the realization of power] through non-political means, such as technical co-operation with other nations of international organizations.").
41. See Mearsheimer, supra note 38, at 3. This is how large and small states
behave in all alliance-based actions.
42. Calling international law epiphenomenal "isa nice way of saying it is stupid." David J. Bederman, Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in International
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 469, 473 (2001).
43. The history of the first forty-four years of the U.N. appears to vindicate
this as a political theory supported by empirical evidence. Military force operating
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Yet, strict realist assumptions about multilateralism fail adequately to
explain cooperation and coordination among states in a range of security
activities, including in areas where states quite clearly have acted against
their own short and medium-term interests.44 If powerful states act rationally in pursuit of aggrandizing their power, why do multilateral security
institutions persist, even during a period (i.e., the Cold War) when some
central institutions like the Security Council exercised their functions relatively infrequently? This requires an explanation that focuses less on formalist explanations of the legal rules of the Charter and more on the ways
45
in which multilateral organizations operate as norm regimes.
3.

Institutionalism

Institutionalism, which began as an offshoot of realism (that is,
among international law skeptics), provides an account and definition of
multilateralism that balances the competing views of realism and legal formalism and offers a more pragmatic approach to evaluating the behavior
under the auspices of the U.N. was invoked only twenty times between 1945 and
1989. See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 29, at 17, App. A (providing table of invocations of U.N. force for years 1989-2000). During that same time period, the world
experienced approximately 100 incidents that could be categorized as armed conflicts that breached international peace. See Sec'y-Gen., Report of the Secretary-General
on An Agendafor Peace:PreventiveDiplomacy, Peacemakingand Peace-keeping, 14, delivered to the members of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17,
1992) (estimating over 100 conflicts, leaving twenty million dead between 1946
and 1989). Nonetheless, longitudinal models demonstrate a persistent decline in
the global magnitude of armed conflict since it peaked in the early 1990s. See
MONTY G. MARSHALL & TED ROBERT GURR, PEACE AND CONFLICT 2005: A GLOBAL
SURVEY OF ARMED CONFLICTS, SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS, AND DEMOCRACY

1

(2005). Broad conclusions regarding causation, as opposed to mere correlation,
between the persistence of war and the existence of collective security mechanism
can be misleading. See Cuellar, supra note 29, at 221 n.49 (arguing that "sovereignty-centered collective security" of U.N. has been marginal in addressing international security problems, while acknowledging that it would be "difficult to make
statistically rigorous inferences about the precise impact of the United Nations or
international law on the extent of global violent conflict").
44. For examples in which states acted through the Council for reasons
counter to their apparent self-interest, see S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/418 (Dec. 9, 1977) (establishing arms embargo against South Africa); S.C.
Res. 421, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/421 (Nov. 4,1977) (establishing Security
Council committee to monitor South African compliance with Resolution 418).
45. See Robert 0. Keohane, Multilateralism:An Agenda for Research, 45 INT'L J.
731, 737 (1990) (discussing institutionalists, rational institutionalists and neo-liberal institutionalists) [hereinafter An Agenda for Research]; see also Robert 0. Keohane, The Demand for InternationalRegimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 141, 153-54
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (arguing that regimes form and are necessary
when at least one of following three conditions is met: absence of clear legal framework that imposes liability for action, imperfect information or high transaction
costs). Institutionalists take law into account as important to some aspects of politics, but not to the core national interests. Institutions and regimes reduce transaction costs, stabilize expectations and allow "repeat playing" and cooperation in
international affairs. See id. at 153-61 (discussing efficiencies that regimes
provide).
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of international institutions. The persistence of multilateral security institutions in defiance of both the classical realists who insist that institutions
are "epiphenomenal," and those legal formalists who see international order as largely derived from neutral rules and process, required an alternative account; institutionalism bridged the gap.
The political scientist John Ruggie defines broad multilateralism as
"the co-ordination of relations among three or more states according to a
set of principles." 46 Ruggie's definition built on an earlier description by
Robert Keohane of multilateralism as "the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states." 47 From an institutionalist perspective, it is the multilateralform of an institution which creates
"robust and adaptive" characteristics that enhance durability and adaptability. 48 It is this adaptability-not the formalism of the legal rules-that
makes U.N. multilateralism generally, and U.N. security multilateralism
specifically, enduring.
By adding the normative dimension to coordinated policies, Ruggie
acknowledges that multilateral behavior is motivated by more than raw
political preference on the part of the states, but includes a set of rules
that govern the relationships of states entering into the multilateral arrangement. 49 These rules are created by the participating states who
agree to their implementation and enforcement through the multilateral
arrangement itself. Security multilateralism has two dimensions: (1) cooperation and coordination function of participating in collective security
50
and (2) the normative element, or the rules governing the use of force.
Security multilateralism thus includes the political processes of dispute resolution, including the use of force itself,5 1 and the law governing
46. See MULTILATERALISM MArRs, supra note 16, at 6 (contrasting multilateralism with bilateralism).
47. An Agenda for Research, supra note 45, at 731.
48. "[M]uch of the institutional inventiveness within multilateral arrangements today is coming from the institutions themselves, from platforms that arguably represent or at least speak for the collectivities at hand." MULTLATERALISM
MArrYRs, supra note 16, at 6.
49. John Ikenberry is more specific in referring to the principles by which
multilateral relationships are governed as "constraining rules." See MULTLATERALISM MATTERS, supra note 16, at 3-47; G. John Ikenberry, Is American Multilateralism
in Decline?, 1 PERSP. IN POL. 533, 534 (2003), available at http://www.apsanet.org
(citing An Agenda for Research, supra note 45; John Van Oudenaren, What is "Multilateral"?, 117 POL'V REv. 33, 33-47 (2003)) (distinguishing between multilateralism
and other kinds of international relations).
50. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOcIETY 128
(1999) (stating that interactions of states in international system creates structure
of system); ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERTJ. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE
USE

OF

FORCE:

BEYOND THE

UN

CHARTER PARADIGM

51 (1993) (describing collabo-

rative aspect of collective security).
51. Some international lawyers argue that the use of force cannot be construed as a legal process on the fundamental ground that violence is the opposite
of war, but modem multilateralism contemplates the use of force on behalf of
upholding law. See RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 29, at 40-44 (discussing expan-
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those processes. Viewed from this perspective, multilateralism refers to a
variety of international efforts to reduce or eliminate the threat of war: the
use of the individuals, the U.N. or other multilateral organizations as
mediators to the dispute; 52 the use of non-coercive measures designed to
prevent the exercise of violence in the first place;53 the use of force authorized under the authority of the United Nations Security Council;5 4 the
55
use of force under the authority of non-U.N. multilateral organizations;
56
and the joint deployment of military forces of different nations.
This institutionalist framework provides a useful starting point for examining the bases of the functions of U.N. security multilateralism in law
and practice. The next two sections explain how the two elements of security multilateralism-cooperation and norm enforcement-developed
in a way that is distinct from bilateralism or unilateralism and how these
two strands form the core of the Security Council's role in maintaining
peace and security. A close analysis of the Charter and U.N. practice demonstrates that the this aggregation of legal and, to some degree, political
power at the Council was intentional, but was accompanied by a dispersal
of supporting functions carried out in the General Assembly, other organs
of the U.N. and affiliated organizations.
B.

Pre-League of Nations Security Multilateralism

The path from unilateral, ad hoc coalitions to the security multilateralism of the U.N. illustrates how and why this combination of political and
legal authority came to be aggregated at the Security Council and also why
other functions of security multilateralism can be seen as subordinated to
the central peace enforcement powers of the Council. Forms of security
multilateralism have existed almost as long as wars and conflicts have been
sion of definition of threats to peace, breach of peace and actions of aggression as
in order to use U.N. forces to maintain civil order in domestic disputes).
52. An example of this can be seen in the Cambodian peace process. See
STEVEN R.

RATNER, THE NEW

U.N.

PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING PEACE IN LANDS OF CON-

146 (1995) [hereinafter NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING] (discussing U.N. activity in Cambodia during peace process).
53. See Taft & Buchwald, supra note 11, at 563 (explaining that purpose of
preemptive operation in Iraq was to prevent Iraq from using weapons of mass destruction and arguing this action did not violate international law).
54. SeeJules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous
Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
124, 130-38 (1999) (providing examples of use of force by states acting under implied authorizations from U.N.).
55. The Kosovo action was not authorized by the U.N. Security Council, but
was carried out as a NATO operation. SeeJohn C. Yoo, UN Wars, US War Powers, 1
CHI. J. INT'L L. 355, 356 (2000) (discussing United States participation in NATO
action in Kosovo).
56. See Quynh-Nhu Vuong, U.S. Peacekeepingand Nation-Building: The Evolution
of Self-Interested Multilateralism,21 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 804, 808 (2003) (describing
how countries participating in peacekeeping operate under U.N. command).
FLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR
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carried out.5 7 In the ancient world, multilateralism took the form of a
balance of power system functioning among the city-states of ancient
Greece, which transformed the states, all of relatively equal strength, into
a greater world order. 58 The 1648 Peace of Westphalia, ending the Thirty
Years War in Europe, marked the beginning, not only of the modern notion of statehood and sovereignty, but also of modern multilateralism, a
process through which sovereigns interacted with one another. 59 Following the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the great powers-Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia and France-rebuilt the international order at
the Congress of Vienna, 60 a system that "sought to forge a consensus on
the issues confronting Europe and to pave the way for dealing with them
on a multilateral basis." 6 ' After the Concert of Powers failed, 62 it was replaced in the second half of the nineteenth century by a "striving for unilateral advantage checked only by external constraints, while bilateral
alliance formation was raised to a new level of sophistication by Bis-

57. See HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 20 (Simon & Schuster 1994) (suggesting
that Europe faced two options after collapse of "medieval dream of the universal
empire": one country creates another empire or no states can become powerful
enough to create another empire, in which case balance of power keeps most aggressive states "in check").
58. See id. at 21 (providing examples of states that utilized balance of power
systems successfully).
59. See id. at 65 (explaining how France became dominant in seventeenth
century). At the same time, the notion of raison d'9tat became the central rationale
in European diplomacy. See id. (discussing rise of raison d'ttat after Peace of Westphalia). But see PHILLIP BOBBIT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES 502-08 (2002) (arguing
instead that Peace of Westphalia represented beginning of constitutionalism).
60. See KISSINGER, supra note 57, at 78-79, 88. The Congress in some senses
was a precursor of the Helsinki Final Act: "[T] he results achieved at Vienna were
inspired by a certain concept of international relations which excluded the use of
force and which consequently represented a considerable advance on the highway
robbery of the eighteenth century." BoBBrrr, supra note 59, at 164-65 (quoting
JACQUES DROZ, EUROPE BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONS,

1815-1848 (1967).

61. See MULTILATERALISM MATTERS, supra note 16, at 18 n.53 (citing HENRY
KISSINGER, A WORLD RESTORED 5 (1964)) (noting that "Kissinger concentrates on
the Congress system . . .which ended by about 1823" but contends that his own

commentary would hold true for entire Concert system). This institutional framework proved viable for a generation and was, more or less, regarded by its participants as "legitimate," a true "Concert of Powers," as it became known after the
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. See BOBBITr, supra note 59, at 164, 166 (discussing legitimacy of Concert of Powers). But see id. at 539 (contending that Congress
reflected constitutional response to these events).
62. The institutionalization of multilateral security under the Concert has
been attributed to the threat of Napoleonic imperial ambitions and the threat that
the French revolution posed to the very notion of dynastic rule, which brought
diverse cultures and religions to the Concert-England's liberal Protestantism on

the one hand and conservative Catholic Austria and Orthodox Russia on the other.
See MULTILATERALIsM MATTERS, supra note 16, at 18-19. The revolution of 1848
"shook the prevailing concept of legitimate political order from within, and the
sense of international cohesion diverged sharply thereafter." Id. at 580.
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marck." 63 During the same period, on the economic side, free trade
emerged, 64 along with the gold standard, as the paradigms of nineteenth
65
century multilateralism.
Security multilateralism was not like trade. There had been no coalescing principle of behavior comparable to Ricardian trade economics to
govern interactions between states on the security side. States thus continued throughout the nineteenth century to rely on alliances as a means to
express power and balance threats. Those alliances, however, failed to
stop World War I and arguably hastened it. Only after World War I did
the European powers begin to think of security as a common good, like
economic wealth, indivisible and susceptible to public regulation through
the application of principles to state behavior.
C.

Security Multilateralism Under the League of Nations Covenant

The first formal use of the term "multilateral" to refer to a shift from
alliances to some sort of rule-based system for regulating war was made in
conjunction with the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.66 But this form of mul63. Id. at 18-19 (explaining decline of multilateralism after Concert
disbanded).
64. See id.
65. See id. at 19-20 (stating that free trade and gold standard are "paradigms
...of multilateralism"). The gold standard refers to the existence of two conditions: a link between the domestic money supply and gold at fixed, or close to
fixed, rates; and the allowance of the inflow of gold in case of favorable balance of
payments and outflow of gold when there is a disfavorable balance of payments,
both of which allow conversion of currency at relatively fixed rates. See id. at 20
(explaining two conditions that must be present for gold standard to exist). Great
Britain initially pursued free trade unilaterally. But when other countries proved
reluctant to follow the example, Britain was left to negotiate a series of bilateral
tariff agreements. See id. (explaining why Great Britain engaged in trade negotiations with other countries). Some of these bilateral treaties had multilateralconsequences because of the inclusion of most-favored-nation ("MFN") clauses, which
committed each party to extend to the other concessions gained by agreements
with third parties, that is, they were a network of bilateral agreements according to
set of principles (free trade economics and MFN treatment). See id. (explaining
consequences of bilateral treaties such as Cobden-Chevalier Treaty between Great
Britain and France of 1860). The aggregate effect of the bilateral treaties was one
of multilateralizinginternational trade. See id. n.62 (citation omitted).
66. See 10 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 81 (2d ed. 1989) (citing GLAsGow

June 13, 1928, at 10/6) (attributing usage of "multilateralism" to French
Foreign Minister Briand in 1928 when he discussed Kellogg-Briand Pact). "M. Briand insisted specifically on the term 'war of aggression' after first talking generically of all war. The reason was the transformation of bilateralism into
multilateralism." Id. Sixty-three states became parties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact
("Pact") outlawing war and the use of multilateralism in this context recognized
that, among the states party to the treaty, aggression was outlawed, but not selfdefense. See General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National
Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (outlawing war as method to
settle dispute between parties to Pact); see also, Thomas Ehrlich, The MeasuringLine
of Occasion, in INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE USE OF FORCE 129, 133 (Thomas Ehrlich & Mary Ellen O'Connell eds., 1993) (arguing that while Kellogg-Briand Pact
clearly outlawed war to enforce legal rights, legal scholars debated whether right to
HERALD,
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tilateralism as collective security had been established in the Covenant of
the League of Nations a decade earlier. "Collective security systems commit members to combined retaliation against any state, including a mem67
ber of the system, that commits aggression against a member state."
"[A] threat against one is a threat against all" form of collective security
differed from earlier alliances based on defense against threats and attacks
external to the alliance states. 68 It thus formed the foundation for an understanding of peace and security as an indivisible common good.
The framers of the League of Nations intended this new collective
security to supplant the power politics and the ad hoc alliances that led to
World War I with predictability and a certain degree of transparency in the
use of force. 69 They shared the radical hope that the League "would be a
means of abolishing war from the earth and substituting the saner procedures of international conciliation." 70 Multilateral collective security
through the League assumed rational action by state actors; the threat of
collective action was to be viable and credible to such a degree that unilateral acts of aggression would be viewed as too costly. Article 11 of the
League Covenant declared that "[a]ny war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby
declared a matter of concern to the whole League ....-71 Article 10
provided that members would "undertake to respect and preserve as
against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political
independence of all Members of the League." 72 This multilateralism of
collective security was manifested in the broad-but by no means universal-membership and the escalation of economic and political sanctions
available to the member states prior to triggering the collective use of
force. 73 By 1935, fifty-five nations, three-quarters of the nations in the
world, were members of the League. 74 Notably absent, however, were
Germany and Japan, both having withdrawn from the League in 1933, and
the United States and Soviet Union, which had never joined.
armed reprisals remained); CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
21ST CENTURY 164 (2005) (stating that travaux preperatoiresof pact suggest that use
of force in self-defense was preserved under treaty).
67. Edwin M. Smith, Collective Security, Peacekeeping, and Ad Hoc Multilateralism,
in ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note

29.
68. See id. (contrasting collective security and alliance systems by noting that

alliance systems directed efforts at states external to alliance).

69. See id. (explaining that League attempted to replace "European balances

of power with the elements of a global collective security system"); see alSoJOYNER,

supra note 66, at 163-64 (discussing uses of force permitted by Covenant).
70. EvAN LUARD, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 3 (1982).
71. League of Nations Covenant art. 11.
72. Id. art. 10.
73. See Smith, supra note 67, at 82-83 (discussing Articles 12 through 15 of
League Covenant, which permitted mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes, and Article 16, which permitted boycotts and embargo and recommenda-

tion of use of force "to protect the covenants of the League").
74.

JOSEPH WHITAKER, AN ALMANAC FOR THE YEAR OF OUR LORD
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The League Covenant adopted the language of bilateral treaties requiring the exhaustion of non-military options such as arbitration to resolve disputes, which made war an option of last resort, but nonetheless an
option. The Covenant also introduced the notion that parties should re75
frain from military action while the League was considering the dispute.
It thus introduced the form of security multilateralism that we recognize
today: one that contemplates an institutional role in the prevention of
armed conflict in addition to codifying the presumption against the legality of war as the primary means of self-help, 76 one characterized by procedural mechanisms (escalation of dispute resolution procedures) and by a
set of norms (presumption against the use of force).
League multilateralism extended the basic principle of collective response within a security alliance to the entire world: external aggression
against one state would trigger a response from the combined armed
77
forces of the rest of the world. Why, then, despite some minor successes,
did League multilateralism fail?
1.

League Failures

The League's failure to serve as an effective brake on military aggression has been attributed to textual flaws in the Covenant, 78 lack of political
will by its members and the notable absence of the Soviet Union and the
United States in the organization. 79 Members had no obligation to take
military action in the event of triggering Article 10, although they were
obligated to participate in the economic sanctions against violators of the
75. See Smith, supra note 67, at 83; see also LAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw
USE OF FORCE By STATES 58 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (1963) (discussing

AND THE

sanctions under Article 16 if member went to war without authorization under
Article 12, 13 or 15 of Covenant);JoYNER, supra note 66, at 165 (articulating three
clear goals of U.N. Charter: preservation of peace, protection of human rights and
promotion of self-determination); LuARD, supra note 70, at 13-14 (stating that
under League's Mandate System, former colonies and possessions of defeated powers were placed under general oversight of League, which set precedent for principle of accountability to international body). The formation and success of
International Labour Organization had the effect of encouraging establishment of
other specialized agencies.
76. See BROWNLIE, supra note 75, at 57 (discussing general purpose of
Covenant).
77. See LUARD, supra note 70, at 3-4 (describing League's success in resolving
frontier dispute between Sweden and Finland, defending sovereignty of Albania,
securing withdrawal of Greek forces from Bulgaria in 1925 and resolving territorial
dispute between Turkey and Iraq over Mosul).
78. For example, the requirement for unanimous adoption of sanctions and
the failure to define precisely what kinds of force were prohibited as "resort to
war." See FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 36, at 257 (citing BROWNLIE,
supra note 75, at 66).
79. See id. at 255 (discussing reasons for Covenant's failure to prohibit war).
Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1936 and the
Soviet attack on Finland in 1939 signaled the collapse of the League and the interwar agreements. See RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 29, at 11 (providing reasons for failure of implementation of rules against participating in war).
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Covenant. 80 Nevertheless, when those economic sanctions failed, the
Council of the League was empowered merely to "recommend" military
action. 8 1 And despite the fact that such a recommendation carried no
obligation to act, no military action was ever even recommended. 82 Because members made decisions at the League on the basis of individual
state interests and not violations of the norm of non-aggression, the period of the League saw more individual acts of aggression by one state
against another than at any other time in the preceding century.8 3 The
principle of multilateral collective security within an international institution broke down completely.

In contrast to the vision of its founders, the League turned out to be
not a universalized version of a security alliance, but rather a non-universal

organization lacking both the actual obligation of collective security and
the means through which to enforce such an obligation. As a result,
League members acted in their own individual interests rather than collectively on behalf of broader international security or in furtherance of international rules.
2.

InterwarArrangements

Nonetheless, a norm against aggressive war had taken root, strengthened by the conviction that the devastation of World War I could not be
repeated. The small-group multilateral security treaties that were negotiated and signed during the interwar period reflected this normative dimension of the Covenant and, though limited in membership, set up
procedures that reflected collective decision-making. The 1925 Locarno
Treaty between Germany, Belgium, France, Britain and Italy, for example,
included a provision under which the parties agreed not to attack or invade each other except where it was a collective action under the League
Covenant or legitimate application of self-defense. 8 4 The Kellogg-Briand
Pact, which reached near-universal membership, 85 established the pre80. See League of Nations Covenant art. 16 (outlining sanctions for violations
of Articles 12, 13 or 15 of Covenant); see also LuARD, supra note 70, at 5.
81. See League of Nations Covenant art. 16.
82. Under the League Covenant, even in cases where force might have been
recommended, the armed forces designated to respond to the aggression were to
remain under national control. See LuARi, supra note 70, at 7.
83. See id. at 5.
84. See FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 36, at 258 (citing Treaty of

Mutual Guarantee Between F.R.G., Belg., Fr., Gr. Brit. and Italy, art. 1, Oct. 16,
1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 290; Treaty of Mutual Guarantee Between Fr. and Pol., art. 1,
Oct. 16, 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 354; Treaty of Mutual Guarantee Between Fr. and
Czech., art. 1, Oct. 16, 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 360); FinalProtocolof the Locarno Conference,
1925, 20 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 21 (1926)) (explaining that Article 1 of Locarno
treaty allows parties to exercise self-defense or act pursuant to Article 16 of League
of Nations Covenant).
85. Sixty-three states had acceded to the Kellogg-Briand Pact by 1938. See
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 36, at 258 (quoting BROWNLIE, supra

note 75, at 75 n.5) (noting that at outbreak of World War II, all states of world but
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sumption in international law against military action except in cases of
self-defense. Together with the League Covenant, these treaties represented the ascendance of the norm prohibiting the use of force to promote international political aims. But, while the League and these treaties
promoted the idea of non-violent dispute resolution, the failure of the
League and these treaty systems to prevent World War II raised the question whether any international institution purporting to restrain state action according to law could ever succeed.
The failure of the League raised a core empirical question about multilateralism: Was World War II the result of the League's failure to prevent
it, or the result of the separate failures of the governments in the League
to act to prevent war? This would prove to be a vexing question about the
relevance of security multilateralism during the creation of the United Nations: Could any multilateral organization have prevented war? If the answer was no, why create one? 86 The question has continuing salience

today in examining the effectiveness of past security multilateralism in order to make recommendations for how security multilateralism should be
applied in the future. 87 The failure of the League to create an enforceable obligation of collective action in the face of aggression was specifically
88
addressed in the text of the Charter.
D.

Security Multilateralism Under the United Nations Charter

In drawing from the immediate lessons of the failures of the League
period, the founders of the U.N. sought to meld two approaches to reducing the occurrence of war: (1) an international institution embodying the
normative constraint against the use of force, coupled with an effective
political mechanism for managing the escalation of disputes and the adoption of collective security measures; and (2) an internationalized version
89
of the political and military alliance that defeated Germany and Japan.
four-Bolivia, El Salvador, Uruguay and Argentina-were parties to Kellogg-Briand Pact).

86. See

LUARD,

supra note 70, at 14.

87. The core of the empirical problem in security multilateralism is causation.
Keohane has pointed this out in the contemporary context of international organizations, but the causation problem applies equally to historical examinations of the
League's role in World War II. See Keohane, supra note 45, at 731.
88. The problem of enforcement of the obligation to participate in collective

security-putting teeth in the actual institution through the designation of armed
forces to be at the disposal of the organization-was also addressed during the
discussions at the San Francisco Conference. See FAIRNESS

IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,

supra note 36, at 258 (indicating "how and in what circumstances ... Articles 42-47
[are] to be implemented").
89. The original twenty-six states that met in January 1942 to declare themselves the United Nations were all allies against the Axis powers. See LuARD, supra
note 70, at 17. The coordination of efforts among the Allies to create a United
Nations continued up through the San Francisco Conference (including incorporating proposals at Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta) with the aim of establishing the
organization before the end of the war. Roosevelt told Congress, "[tihis time we
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In essence, it was to be a "coalition of the willing" acting according to a set
90
of rules.
Article 2(4), which prohibits the unilateral, non-defensive use of
force, has been described as the "legal cornerstone" to the rules governing
the use of force under the Charter, 91 and represents the central normative
92
But like the
claim of the United Nations: Peace is preferable to war.
Covenant, the Charter codified important qualifications to that foundational prohibition. First, Article 51 permits states to employ force in self93
Second,
defense, where that self-defense conforms to international law.
shall not make the mistake of waiting until the end of the war to set up the machinery of peace. This time, as we fight together to get the war over quickly, we work
together to keep it from happening again." LuARD, supra note 70, at 35-36. Even
among the former Allied Powers, however, the lessons learned from WWII were
perceived differently. This may explain, in part, the deep divisions that would
arise between Europe and the United States on the legality and legitimacy of the
Iraq invasion of 2003. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism,
79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1971, 1984-92 (2004) (contrasting roots of American unilateralism with European multilateralism).
90. Thomas Franck notes that this modern term "coalition of the willing" has
its root in the authorization of ad hoc participation in enforcement actions provided in Article 43 of the Charter. See RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 29, at 25.
For further discussion, see infra notes 278, 290 and accompanying text.
91. SeeJOYNER, supra note 66, at 165 (asserting fundamental intent of Article
2(4) is to prevent states from using force against "territorial integrity" or "political
independence" of other states). Article 2(4) states: "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
92. Thomas Franck has called Article 2(4) the Lauterpachtian "ground
norm," that is, a reflection of Hersh Lauterpacht's description of the "primordial
duty of the law" that "there shall be no violence by states." See RECOURSE TO FORCE,
supra note 29, at 1, 20 (citing HERSH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 64 (1933)).
The language of Article 2(4) has left room for interpreting what is meant by
"force," and whether it includes non-violent "force" such as extreme economic coercion. The majority view is that it refers only to armed force or military aggression. SeeJovNER, supra note 66, at 166 (noting that acts of economic aggression or
cultural imperialism are not considered under rubric of "force"). This view was
confirmed, for example, by General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974) defining
"aggression" as "the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this definition."
Id. (noting that threat to use force is not included in definition).
93. Article 51 states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
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Article 42, permits the Security Council to authorize the use of force when
it has determined that such force is necessary to restore peace and security. 9 4 While the blanket prohibition and two qualifications outline the legal constraints on the use of armed force, the Charter also provides the
legal basis for the coordination and cooperation of actions of member
states necessary to manage broad security multilateralism.
1.

Coordination of Security Relations

a.

Composition and Structure of the Council

Because the U.N. was established to perfect the collective security
mechanism that had failed in the League, the collective security provisions
of the Charter took on a different shape from those of the Covenant. 95
Chapter V provides that the U.N. Member States "confer on the Security
Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security" and agree that the Council "acts on their behalf."96 This
"The drafting history shows that article 51 was intended to safeguard the
Chapurtepec treaty which provided for collective defense in case of armed attack."
Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1633
(1984). The Charpurtepec Act of 1941 "declared, in effect, that aggression against
one American state shall be considered an act of aggression against all." Id. at
1633-34 (citing D.W. BowETr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 183 (1958)).
This explicitly informed the discussions at San Francisco. Thus, the collective security norm adopted in the Charter reflects the language of regional defense alliances. The challenge would be applying the norm in an institution with universal
membership.
94. Article 42 states:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of
Members of the United Nations.
U.N. Charter art. 42.
95. Franck refers to the difference between the League approach and the
U.N. approach as a shift from collective self-defense to one of collective security.
See FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 36, at 257, 259 (reciting transitional
steps from League approach to sources of law providing foundation for Charter);
see also RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 29, at 2 (describing intent of Charter as
initiating era in which war is prohibited as means of state policy but collective
security is norm).
96. The authority to maintain international peace and security and take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
rests with the Security Council under Chapters V, VI, VII and VIII of the Charter.
See NATION AGAINST NATION, supra note 29, at 161 ("The drafters of the UN Charter intended the Security Council to be the pivotal organ of the new international
system they were devising."). U.N. Charter art. 24 (noting that Security Council
has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" in accordance with provisions of Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII). Chapter XII,
which addresses U.N. authority under the Trusteeship System created to govern
former colonial possessions of the axis powers, is beyond the scope of this Article.
This list of enumerated powers of the Council is not meant to be exclusive. See
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 448 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d
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conferral of binding power on the Council to act on behalf of the entire
membership is the keystone of all other multilateral security functions carried out by the Council and by other organs of the U.N. acting in support
of those security functions. 9 7 The membership, voting and decision making structure reflect the historical compromise between the allied powers
who wanted to concentrate all the executive powers of the U.N. in themselves, and the smaller states who wanted a broader base of participation
in Council measures. 98 The structure and power of the Council resulting
from this compromise created a body that serves executive and quasi-legislative functions in international security. 9 9 By demarcating the executive
powers of the Council and the limited plenary powers of the General Assembly, and including specific provisions formalizing methods of communication between the two bodies, the founders corrected the earlier failure
of the League Covenant to delineate political powers clearly. 10 0
b.

Investigation and Dispute Resolution Powers

Unlike the League Covenant, the Charter places the dispute resolution procedures under the competence of the Security Council.1 0 Under
ed. 2002) [hereinafter U.N.

CHARTER COMMENTARY]

(noting that while Council is

organ with "'specific' powers" it has "'general' powers as well"); see also infra notes
101-09 (discussing U.N. investigation and dispute resolution powers). Chapter V
describes the composition, powers and procedures of the Council; Chapter VI lays
out the procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes; and Chapter VII defines
the power of the Security Council to take binding measures to preserve international peace and security, including through the use of force. Chapter VIII describes regional arrangements, which can be used as sub-organs of the Council in
carrying out enforcement actions. See U.N. Charter chs. V, VI and VII. For a discussion of the legal basis of the Council's power to bind Member States along as
well as Council practice under Article 25, see U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra, at
458-64.

97. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 450-52 (discussing history and practice of Council actions taken under Article 24). There is some dispute over the question whether, as a matter of international law, the Security
Council acts on behalf of the Member States or on behalf of the United Nations.
See id. at 448-49 (citing Degni-Segui, Article 24, inJ.P. COT & A. PELLET, LA CHARTE
DES NATIONS UNIEs 450 (2d. ed. 1991); D. DicKE & H.W. RENGELING, DIE
SICHERUNG DES WELTFRIEDENSDURCH DIE VEREINTEN NATIONEN-EIN UBERBLICK
UBER DIE BEFUGNISSE DER WICHTIGSTEN ORGANE (1975); HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 280-84 (1964); 2 G. DAHM ET AL., VOLKERRECHT (1961)). This

debate does not bear on how the Council carries out its powers.
98. U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 443-44 (discussing compromise reached at San Francisco Conference).
99. Id. at 445; see also Alvarez, supra note 27, at 874 (describing counter-terrorism efforts at U.N. Security Council as examples of its "legislative" phase). The
danger of too much legislative power is that the Council becomes vulnerable to
"capture" by the hegemonic power. Id. at 883 (finding Council's "legislative prowess" may render it vulnerable to "global hegemonic international law").
100. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supranote 96, at 445 (asserting that primary responsibility for maintaining peace remains with Security Council, with secondary, co-responsibility placed with General Assembly).
101. See U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 2, arts. 34, 35.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006

23

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 12
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: p. 149

Chapter VI, the Council is empowered to "investigate any dispute" which
might "lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute" as part of its
mandate to maintain international peace and security. 102 While the General Assembly has general plenary authority to discuss and pass resolutions
relating to disputes, the Security Council effectively has the ability to preempt the Assembly by taking action on any matter.1 0 3 This has practical
significance in that the Council, as the U.N. organ empowered with the
balance of political and enforcement power for the maintenance of peace
and security, may take the lead in preventing and settling a dispute before
it escalates to violent conflict.104 The powers of the Council under this
chapter are generally understood to include any measures up to, but not
10 5
including,. coercive action.
Another significant feature of the Council's dispute resolution authority is its connection to Article 2(3), which provides that "[a]ll Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endan102. Id. art. 34.
103. See id. art. 35 (limiting proceedings of General Assembly on any disputes
to be subject to provisions of Articles 11 and 12 of Charter, requiring that Assembly
refer threats to international peace and security to Council and prohibiting Assembly from making recommendations where Security Council has already taken action). But see U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 44546 (noting that
one possible interpretation of Art. 24-as corroborated by Art. 11 (2)-is that Assembly has no power in area of international security) (emphasis added).
104. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 447. The U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY states that:
[P]lacing the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and
security on the Security Council means that the Security Council and the
General Assembly have a parallel or concurrent competence with regard
to dealing with questions of maintenance of peace, but that the Security
Council possesses exclusive competence with regard to taking effective and binding
action, especially enforcement measures.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing HANS KELSEN, THE LAw OF THE UNITED NATIONS 283
(1964)); L.M. GOODRICH, The UN Security Council in THE UNITED NATIONS: PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 20 (J. Barros ed., 1972)); see a/soJose E. Alvarez, Judging the
Security Council, 90 AM.J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (1996) (analyzing role of Council action in
forming legal precedent); Louis B. Sohn, The Security Council's Role in the Settlement
of InternationalDisputes, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 402, 402-04 (1984) (noting Council's
powers are independent). The one exception to the Council's broad power in this
domain may be binding decisions made by the International Court of Justice,
which is generally viewed as operating independently of the Council. See U.N.
CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 447 (noting that International Court of
Justice's (ICJ) ability to determine matter is not restricted by Council action, evidenced by requirement in Article 94(2) that Council may be called upon to enforce ICJ opinion as necessary); Rosalyn Higgins, The Place of InternationalLaw in
the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council, 64 Am.J. INT'L L. 1, 1-18 (1970) (asserting Council is not authorized to make legal interpretations that are binding on
non-consenting states).

105. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 584 (recognizing that
earlier practice of Council in area of dispute resolution left some doubt as to
whether it was acting under its enforcement powers in way that could bind
parties).
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gered."' 0 6 Like Article 2(4), Article 2(3) reflects the norm of non-violent
107
Its "detailed elaboradispute settlement established by the League.
tion," however, through Article 33, which empowers the Council to call
upon the parties to settle their dispute by "peaceful means," places dispute
10 8
The "peaceful
resolution at the heart of the Council's functions.
means" enumerated in Article 33 contemplate a range of dispute resolution activity: fact-finding, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, arbitration and
the use of international tribunals.' 0 9
c.

Economic and Military Sanctions

Chapter VII, the most significant departure from the League Covenant, confers on the Council coercive enforcement power through the use
of economic and military sanctions1 10 and, ultimately, the application of
106. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.
107. Id.
108. See id. art. 33; see also U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 58385 (discussing relationship between two Articles).
109. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 588-91 (discussing procedures that constitute "peaceful means"). This list is illustrative, not exclusive, as
Article 33 leaves open the option to pursue "other peaceful means." Id. In practice, the Council has carried out these functions through both oversight and active
participation in the dispute resolution procedures alongside the parties to the dispute. Articles 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 confer authority in the Council, in effect, to
supervise dispute settlement of the parties. U.N. Charter arts. 36-38; see also U.N.
CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 588-91 (discussing Article 33); id. at 598601 (discussing Article 34); id. at 609-14 (discussing Article 35); id. at 616-27 (discussing Article 36); id. at 630-38 (discussing Article 37); id. at 644-48 (discussing
Article 38).
110. Article 41 authorizes the Council to "decide what measures not involving
the use of armedforce are to be employed to give effect to its decisions" and to "call
upon [Member States] to apply such measures." U.N. Charter art. 41; see also U.N.
CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 736-37 (noting that Article 16 of League
Covenant was precursor and partial model for Article 41). It thereby permits sanctions to be imposed and, in another departure from the League Covenant, enforced against all Member States. Among the illustrative list of measures capable
of being taken under Article 41 are "complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations." U.N. Charter art. 41; see U.N.
CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 740-45 (discussing other potential measures, including creation of international criminal tribunals and establishment of
post-conflict administrative entities). Like all enumerated Chapter VII powers, the
sanctions can be applied by the Council regardless of whether international law
has been breached by the State against whom the measures are taken. See id. at
739 ("[Measures under Article 41] can be employed whenever this appears conducive to maintenance of international peace and security."). Because they are not
sanctions per se, the precise legal term is "enforcement measures," which has been
used by the U.N. and by international tribunals. Id. (citing sources). But because
"sanctions" is the commonly applied term, it is useful in framing these measures as
stopping short of actual use of force. See Christopher C. Joyner, United Nations
Sanctions After Iraq: Looking Back to See Ahead, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 329, 330-33 (2003)
(noting "sanctions" in context of U.N. action entails internationally legitimized
forceful measures). For a further discussion of sanctions in the taxonomy, see
infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
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armed force, wherever the Council "shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression ..... "I In
practice, the requirement of determining a threat to international peace
and security has led the Council to employ formal investigations-on its
own or as supervisor of other U.N. bodies, including subsidiary organs of
the General Assembly-in the service of its enforcement function.' 12 In
effect, all powers of the Security Council under Chapters V and VI serve
Chapter VII enforcement powers whenever there is a threat to the peace.
Additionally, unlike the League Covenant, an actual breach of law by a
13
Member State is not a prerequisite to those enforcement powers.'
d.

Enforcement Through Military Means

Article 42 authorizes the Council to take military measures to "maintain or restore international peace and security." 1 14 This decision to employ force under United Nations command, or authorize force by a
Member State, group of Member States or a regional organization, may be
taken whenever measures under Article 41 "would be inadequate or have
proved to be inadequate."' 15 The authorization of the use of armed force
under Article 42 was adopted unanimously at the San Francisco Conference and is broadly considered one of the central improvements over the
failed League system for enforcement of collective security. 116 Article 42
has also been invoked frequently and significantly in the post Cold-War
17
period. 1
111. U.N. Charter art. 39. Chapter VII further permits that the Council "shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."
Id.
112. Further, this power has been understood to extend to internal conflicts,
effectively extending the power of the Council to all armed conflict in whatever
context it arises. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supranote 96, at 723 ("While the
concept of threat to the peace in Art. 39 may have originally referred mainly to
threats of inter-state conflicts; the Security Council soon abandoned such a strict
reading.") (citation omitted).
113. See id. at 705 (distinguishing Chapter VII powers of Charter from collective action measures available under League Covenant, which were characterized
as sanctions in response to breach of law).
114. U.N. Charter art. 42 ("Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security.").
115. Id.
116. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supranote 96, at 751 ("While the League
Council could merely recommend that States apply armed force against an aggres-

sor, the newly created Security Council should, pursuant to Art. 42, be able to
place troops at the disposal of the Security Council.").

117. See, e.g.,

DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT

UN SECURITv COUNCIL OF ITS
VII POWERS 168 (1999) (discussing Security Council's delegation of its
Chapter VII powers to Member States to use force in Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia);
Helmut Freudenschuss, Between Unilateralismand Collective Security: Authorizations of
OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY. THE DELEGATION BY THE

CHAPTER
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Chapter VII provides for the creation of the Military Staff Committee,
which, like much of the rest of the enforcement mechanisms of the Charter, immediately fell victim to the Cold War.' 11 Chapter VIII recognizes
the legal personality of regional organizations that might also have the
maintenance of peace and security as their mandate. 11 9
e.

Uniting for Peace and Chapter 6 1/2

The drafters of the Charter did not contemplate that the Council
would lapse into disuse almost from its inception. At the time of the drafting, creation of a formal, secondary role for the General Assembly in
peace and security was considered and rejected, 120 opposed forcefully by
the Use of Force by the UN Security Council 5 EUR.J. INT'L L. 492 (1994) (tracing steps
taken by Security Council since Resolution 665 of 1990 Iraq conflict and examining Security Council authorizations of use of force). For a discussion of invocations of Article 42 in response to situations in East Timor, Kosovo and Iraq, see
infra notes 211-81 and accompanying text.
118. See U.N. Charter art. 45 (requiring that Member States make their air
armed forces available for combined international enforcement actions); id. art. 46
(explaining that Military Staff Committee shall assist Security Council with plans
for application of armed force); id. art. 47 (establishing Military Staff Committee
to report to and be at disposal of Security Council); see also U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 768 ("Article 46 might well be the most obsolete of those
provisions of Chapter VII which have been overtaken by historical events"); id. at
770 (noting that "Military Staff Committee has had no meaningful role to play in
history of U.N. to date").
119. These provisions were originally intended to be effective only in the
short or medium-term, as a bridge between the creation of the United Nations and
the ultimate staffing of a permanent Military Committee that would carry out the
Security Council enforcement measures under unitary United Nations command.
Accordingly, Article 52 recognizes the authority of regional organizations and
their role in pacific dispute settlement, and Article 53 empowers the Council to
use "regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under [Security
Council] authority." U.N. Charter arts. 52, 53. Thus regional organizations-generally collective security cooperatives with actual capacity to act-can lawfully employ force when either the Security Council has identified a threat to peace and
security and uses the regional group to carry out the enforcement, or the regional
organization has made a determination of a threat to peace and security and has
requested permission from the Security Council to act. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 859-60 (articulating how Article 53 governs and limits "permissibility of enforcement measures by regional arrangements"). In the absence
of a standing Military Committee, Article 53 has been invoked by regional organizations to justify their multilateral military interventions in disputes-even absent
explicit Security Council authorization. Two prominent examples during the Cold
War are the Organization of American States (OAS) intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1960 and the OAS naval blockade of Cuba in 1962. See U.N. CHAR_
TER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 860-61 (noting this was first instance of
extensive debate as to regional organizations' rights to enforcement).
120. See RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 29, at 31, 34-39 (stating that Big Powers agreed any member state could call General Assembly's attention to conditions
impairing its security or general welfare); see also NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra
note 52, at 63-64 (noting General Assembly may make recommendations related to
maintenance of collective security).
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the United States. 12 1 Article 11(2) of the Charter grants the General Assembly the power to make recommendations-not binding decisions-on
"questions relating to the maintenance of ... peace and security" except
in instances where the "Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or
situation the functions assigned to it in the... Charter." 122 As the Council enforcement mechanisms fell into desuetude, however, the role of the
Assembly was expanded through the Uniting for Peace Resolution and the
123
creation of so-called "Chapter 6 1/2" peacekeeping operations.
Passed by the Assembly during the Korea crisis in 1950,124 the Uniting
for Peace Resolution, established that, where the Council fails to exercise
its authority (i.e., where it has been deadlocked by veto or threat of a veto)
and where there is a vote of at least seven members of the Council, the
Assembly may act to address threats to peace and security. 125 The Assembly in fact did so-relying on the Uniting for Peace Resolution-in 1956
(the Suez crisis) and in 1960 (Congo).1 26 U.N. peacekeeping missions,
the so-called "blue helmet" operations, developed alongside the Uniting
for Peace Resolution as a way to deploy troops under U.N. auspices, but
for limited, non-enforcement purposes. Despite being authorized in most
cases by the Council, these operations stop short of deploying troops with
authority to use force. 127 They have also been established through resolutions that do not invoke Chapter VII. Thus the moniker Chapter 6 1/2
represents the legal authority for these missions-halfway between pacific
dispute resolution and enforcement actions.
121. The United States viewed the Council's role in peace and security as political in function, with the General Assembly "concerned with the promotion of
constructive solutions of international problems in the widest range of human relationships, economic, social, cultural and humanitarian." RECOURSE TO FORCE,
supra note 29, at 32 (quoting U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull).
122. U.N. Charter art. 11, para. 2, art. 12, para. 1.
123. See RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 29, at 32 (arguing General Assembly's
ability to make recommendations allows it broader powers); U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 262 (discussing lack of restrictions on General Assembly's recommendation power).
124. G.A. Res. 377(V), U.N. Doc. A/377 (Nov. 3, 1950); see also RECOURSE TO
FORCE, supra note 29, at 33-35 (detailing adoption of "Uniting for Peace"
resolution).
125. There is some controversy over whether the recommendations made by
the Assembly can include enforcement actions of a Chapter VII type. See RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 29, at 37-38 (describing General Assembly actions in
light of Security Council deadlocks). The question was largely mooted by the commencement of the practice of creating blue helmet operations, as in Suez and
Congo.
126. See id. at 36 (discussing use of "Uniting for Peace" resolution to create
international emergency force in Suez); id. at 37 (citing creation of the Congo
force (ONUC)).
127. Blue helmets generally were lightly armed and operated under orders to
use force only in self-defense. See RECOURSE TO FORCE, supranote 29, at 39 (recognizing thirty-nine such operations in U.N.'s first fifty years).
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The definition of peacekeeping that prevailed following the Suez crisis was "the stationing of U.N. military personnel, with the consent of warring states, to monitor cease-fires and dissuade violations through
interposition between competing armies." 1 28 Since that time, the term
peacekeeping has come to encompass all consensual deployment of
troops in conflict zones, or former conflict zones, under U.N. command,
for the purpose of maintaining peace. A central tool for addressing peace
and security therefore emerged as a hybrid practice-bridging Council
authority in principle and Assembly authority in fact.
2.

According to a Set of Principles

The Security Council is required to carry out its duties and exercise its
authority "in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations," 129 including the requirement that peace be reached "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law." 1 30 Like the
League Covenant, the U.N. Charter implicitly recognizes that the problem
of peace and security has many causes and articulates the shared aspiration that peace and justice co-exist. The founding members laid out this
duality of mission in the preamble: to "save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war" and "establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained." 13 1 The Council's collective security
128. NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 52, at 10. As the role of the U.N. in
resolving intra and inter-state conflicts during the 1990s expanded, the term
peacekeeping was supplemented with peacemaking ("action to bring hostile parties to agreement") and peace-building ("efforts to identify and support structures
which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and wellbeing among people"). Id. at 16 (quoting The Secretary-General, Report of SecretaryGeneralPursuant to Statement Adopted by Summit Meeting of Security Council on 31 January 1992, 55, U.N. Doc. S/24111, A/47/277 (June 17, 1992)). Indeed, the confusion over terminology has obscured the range of functions-from delivery of
humanitarian aid, to military observation, to policing-that were being carried out
by "peacekeeping" operations during the 1990s.
129. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2.
130. Id. art. 1, para. 1.
131. U.N. Charter pmbl. The centrality of 'Justice" to the United Nations is
explicitly laid out in Article I, which defines the primary purpose of the United
Nations as:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and internationallaw, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
U.N. Charter art. 1,para. 1 (emphasis added). In addition, the words of the preamble-"reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small,"-provide a crucial emphasis on individual rights that has important impli-

cations for multilateral participation in post-conflict justice.

These are aspirational, not concrete, norms. Nor is there anything in the text
of the Charter to require that the Council, in carrying out its enforcement powers,
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functions incorporate the economic and social norms enumerated in
other parts of the Charter-from the aspirational norms set forth in the
preamble to the centrality of human dignity in the provisions relating to
upholding human rights and eliminating discrimination. 1 32 Even where
specific enumerated powers are conferred to the General Assembly, the
incorporation of these normative requirements into the "peace and security" functions creates a symbiotic relationship between the Council and the
other bodies and mechanisms of the U.N. organization.13 3 That relationship has been bolstered through U.N. practice. For example, the U.N.
Human Rights Commission-founded in large part to support the Charter's aspiration of placing respect for human dignity and rights at the
center of international order-is both a producer of information that can
be used by the Council (and by the General Assembly when acting in its
peace and security role) and a means through which the Council monitors
1 34
compliance with its binding obligations.
Enforcement decisions of the Council are the only decisions made by
the U.N. that are binding on Member States. Thus, the Security Council is
empowered to maintain international peace and security in a manner consistent with broad principles of international law and justice; all the other
functions of the U.N. are legally subordinate to that purpose.' 3 5 By suboract to promote justice. See RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 29, at 16-19 (noting
problem of injustice stems more from inaction due to veto than any specific instance of unconscionable action). Thus, what "justice" requires has largely been a
question of evolving practice. Id.
132. See U.N. Charter arts. 55-60 (dealing with international economic and
social co-operation). Social and economic functions are premised on "the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and
friendly relations among nations." Id. art. 55.
133. For a full description of the enumerated powers of the General Assembly, see LUARD, supra note 70, at 54-58; NATION AGAINST NATION, supra note 29, at
185; U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 257-75.
134. The investigations and reporting of the UNHRC were important to the
process of escalating Security Council involvement and the expansion of the U.N.
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992. See, e.g.,
S.C. Res. 771,
5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (Aug. 13, 1992) (calling upon "international humanitarian organizations to collate substantiated information in their
possession ... and make this information available to the Security Council"). That
same day, UNHRC opened a special session on the Bosnia situation, and appointed a special rapporteur to report findings to the Secretary General. See Chronology: Developments Related to the Crisis in Bosnia: March 10-August 28, 1992 (Aug. 31,
1992), in 3 U.S. DEP'T OF ST. DISPATCH 676, 678 (July-Dec. 1992) (noting that on
August 14, 1992 Trdeusc Mazowiecki was appointed to investigate human rights
abuses).

135. In practice, the Security Council rarely explicitly requests that such functions be subordinated. But in recent practice, where the Council has created its
own organs, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, it makes clear it is acting within its Chapter VII enforcement powers, and retains the authority to limit or shut down the activities of the subordinate body. See
S.C. Res. 827,
2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)). In some instances, related multilateral treaties are also effectively subordinated to the enforcement
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dinating all the other functions to the Council's enforcement power, the
Charter clarifies and simplifies the normative element of security multilateralism as dependent on: (1) Security Council determination that the
use of force meets the self-defense exception under Article 51 or (2) Se136
curity Council authorization of the use of force.
The power of the United Nations to address armed conflict and maintain just peace can therefore be understood, as a matter of Charter law, to
be aggregated at the Security Council. At the same time, the functions
through which the U.N. organization works in support of that aggregated
legal mandate are dispersed throughout the organization and are carried
out by many bodies and affiliated organizations. These separate functions
form a taxonomy of security multilateralism.
II.

A

TAXONOMY OF

U.N.

SEcURv

MULTILATERALISM

Part I of this Article established that U.N. security multilateralism encompasses much more than the Article 42 decision to authorize the use of
force to counter threats to international security. At the same time, those
additional functions of security multilateralism derive their legal authority
from, and exist at the service of, the enforcement and collective security
mechanisms. The aggregate of these functions forms U.N. security multilateralism. In order to examine the empirical differences between outside
actions taken under the U.N. enforcement mechanism and those in which
the U.N. was not used, these broad functions need to be unbundled, or
disaggregated, into functions that are susceptible to effective comparative
case study.
Six distinct functions of security multilateralism find basis in both the

Charter and in the practice of the U.N.: (1) assessment, (2) intermediation, (3) humanitarian assistance, (4) sanctions, (5) military intervention
and (6) post-conflict administration. 137 These functions derive directly
powers of the Council. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art.
16, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (deferring power of International
Criminal Court to commence or proceed with prosecution when Security Council
has so requested under its Chapter VII authority).
136. Because even uses of force by regional organizations require Security
Council authorization, it is fair to characterize all security multilateralism as encompassing these two normative dimensions. There is, however, general acknowledgment that consensual uses of force are permitted outside the Security Council
context. For example, if a state invites another state to deploy peacekeepers to put
down an internal uprising, it would be considered lawful. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 684 (detailing legal basis of such consensual peacekeeping in United Nations Charter).
137. Steven Ratner ascribes to his broader definition of peacekeeping ("second generation peacekeeping"), several of the functions that I include here as part
of security mutlilateralism. The actual functions (administrative, mediation, political governance) have considerable overlap with the taxonomy here, and Ratner's
own typology is extremely useful in understanding the ways in which past U.N.
interventions have operated. See NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 52, at 41 tbl.
2.1 (describing functions performed by second generation peacekeeping mis-
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from the legal authority of the Council to address threats to international
1 8
peace and security, but are often carried out by non-Council bodies.
Indeed, each of the discrete functions can be performed by non-U.N. organizations or by States operating entirely outside the formal security multilateral system. 13 9 Because they can be performed-and historically have
been performed-by actors and sub-groups separate from the U.N., this
taxonomy offers a framework for measuring U.N. performance against
non-U.N. performance. Disaggregating also permits closer examination of
the extent to which the U.N. plays more (or less) of a role in those disputes that have been characterized as "unlawful" or contrary to the norms
of the Charter.
Table 1.0 illustrates the taxonomy of security multilateralism along
with the basis for categorizing actions taken in a particular conflict, the
specific legal authority under the Charter or related legal instruments and
the potential rationales of the functions emanating from theoretical ac140
counts of multilateral behavior.
At the enforcement stage, the coordination/cooperation element of
the U.N. and the application of the substantive norms are generally characterized as an "on-off switch": the U.N. is involved in the conflict or it is
not. 1 4 1 The taxonomy illustrates that actual U.N. practice is more complex. The functions of the U.N. can more easily be understood as a continuum or series of functions, that, when disaggregated, present a clearer
picture of what U.N. multilateralism is and how to evaluate its effectiveness. This disaggregation highlights the fact that arguments that characterize outside involvement in conflict as "unilateral" or "multilateral"
frequently focus narrowly on the military intervention function-ignoring
the extent to which other functions that are significant to addressing the
threat are carried out multilaterally or unilaterally.
sions). I take a somewhat broader view of the functions, both in terms of preconflict prevention functions (assessment, humanitarian aid, sanctions) and postconflict nation-building. Most importantly, I depart from Ratner's focus on consensual interventions. Quite purposely I have chosen to look at non-consensual
activities in order to demonstrate the range of possible roles for the U.N. and
compare them with other potential non-consensual guarantors of peace and
security.
138. See, e.g., id. at 82, 86 tbl. 3.1 (describing peacekeeping roles played by
Council, Assembly, Secretariat, other U.N. organs, regionals organs, international
financial institutions (IFIs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and media).
139. Functions can, of course, be contracted out to NGOs and other private
entities. Id.
140. Legitimacy and fairness-based analysis can be expanded beyond the
questions raised by the legal prohibition against non-defensive use of force to look,
for example, at whether the U.N. assessment function in a particular case has promoted legitimacy and fairness. Institutionalist rationales based on overcoming collective action problems can be similarly measured. For a further discussion of
these rationales, see infra note 152 and accompanying text.
141. See generally Higgins, supranote 104 (discussing how Security Council applies principles of international law when settling disputes).
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1.0:

TAXONOMY OF FUNCTIONS

U.N.

SECUITY MULTILATERALISM
U.N. CHARTER
PROVISIONS/

FUNCTION

ASSESSMENT

MECHANISMS

U.N. AGENCIES

RATIONALE FOR

TREATIES

Ch. IV. Arts.

FUNCTION

Intelligence

General

Cooperation
Fact-finding
bodies
Inspection
regimes
Special

Assembly
10,11,13
Security Council Ch. VI. Art. 34
HR committees Ch. VII Art. 39
UNHRC
HR treaties
Constituting
treaties

collective action
problem
Deter and
monitor rule
violations

Provision of
food, shelter
Refugee
protection,
relocation

General
Assembly
agencies (e.g.,
UNDP, UNHCR,
WFP)

General
Assembly
Constituting
treaties
Ch. VI and Ch.

Foundational
norm of human
dignity
Prevent, limit
resource-based

VII

conflict

Traditional

Security Council

Ch. VI. Arts. 33-

Prevent conflict

diplomacy
Facilitation of
negotiation
Active mediation
Adjudication

& Sec'y Gen.
Special
Representatives
Ad hoc
arrangements

38

Promote pacific
and welfareenhancing
solutions

Address

rapporteurs

HUMANrrARLAN
ASSISTANCE

INTERMEDIATION

Arbitration

SANcTIONS

Pro-visional
measures
Economic and
military
sanctions
Regional

Security Council Ch. VII. Arts. 39- Address
Special Sanctions 41
collective action
committees
problem
Coercive
measures to
prevent war

sanctions and
boycotts

MILITARY
INTERVENTION

Advisors
Protective forces

Security Council

(maintain status
quo during
humanitarian
operation)
War fighting

Ch. VII. Arts. 42- Prevent or end
43, 48
violation of

Ch. VIII Arts. 52- other norms
54
(humanitarian
intervention)
Enforce rules
Restore peace

Peace-keeping

POST-CoNuLICr

Policing

ADMINISTRATION Civil
administration
judicial
functions

and security

Security Council

Ch. VII
General
Peace
Assembly organs agreements
Ad hoc tribunals, ICC statute
ICC

Maintenance of

peace and
security
Create preconditions for
other norm

An additional advantage of the taxonomy is to inform normative discussions with broader facts about the cases. For example, these "disaggregated" functions can appear less threatening to the unilateralists or
"sovereigntists" 14 2 who are focused solely on the decision to authorize
force in response to a threat. Similarly, to strict multilateralists, it can shed
142. See Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its
False Prophets, FOREIGN Atos., Nov./Dec. 2000, at 9, 9-10 (discussing "sovereigntist"

view that United States can decide what international regimes to participate in).
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light on those functions outside the Article 42 powers that are most susceptible to reform, i.e., those functions that temporally precede military
intervention, but that are nonetheless essential to conflict resolution.
More broadly, the taxonomy demonstrates the role of incremental steps;
decisions and actions taken within each of the functions of the taxonomy
can have significant impact on the degree to which threats to international
security are adequately addressed.
Some initial caveats about the taxonomy are in order. The taxonomy
classifications are not static events. Each function more or less reflects a
phase in the escalation and de-escalation of armed conflict and the role of
outside parties in the escalation and de-escalation of conflict. Several of
the functions may substantially overlap with one another in any given case.
Assessment, for example, generally occurs on an ongoing basis, initially
providing information necessary to engage subsequent functions such as
humanitarian assistance or economic sanctions and later providing rationales for the continuation or cessation of those functions. 143 The taxonomy does not account for exogenous variables that might affect the
performance of each function, such as budgets. The taxonomy may therefore be less suited to quantitative analyses of the functions and more
suited to qualitative and descriptive case studies.
A significant danger in attempting to measure the success of outside
interventions in conflict case studies lies in time measurement of the
study. In the long run, what matters is sustainable peace. Here, the intent
is to create a mechanism through which both short and medium-term effects of security multilateralism can be observed and evaluated-perhaps
even in the context of ongoing cases (e.g., each of the cases examined
here) and in the process add value to the project of institutional
assessment.
The taxonomy helps address, but does not eliminate, the central challenge to empirical examination of multilateral institutions and war: causation. Quantitative work on the causes of war and the methods for limiting
war has been taking place in the political science literature for some
time. 1 4 4 Much of that work comes out of important and useful systematic
efforts to compile datasets amenable to quantitative analysis. 145 Fewer international law studies have been done on the incidence of war as it relates
143. This is certainly the case in Kosovo, where the U.N. assessment continued throughout the pre- and post-intervention phases, even though the intervention itself was not carried out by the U.N. For a further discussion of Kosovo, see
infra notes 233-55 and accompanying text.
144. See generally Taylor Seybolt, MajorArmed Conflicts 2000, in SIPRI YEAIBOOK
2001, at 15, 16 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (examining intra-state conflicts in fourteen countries).
145. The Correlates of War Project (and Correlates of War 2), The Conflict

Data Project and Major Episodes of Political Violence Project, are the datasets on
war that are most widely used, and contain variables to measure frequency, location and severity of conflicts. See Seybolt, supra note 144, at 82 n.9. They are set up
to test hypotheses of war causation.
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to international legal regimes and/or international institutions.1 46 As
Robert Keohane has explained, the central problem of testing the hypothesis that the existence of international institutions causes more war is the
problem of the null-set hypothesis. There is no alternative set of nation
states interacting without the framework of U.N. multilateralism against
which to test the current system. 147 At best, therefore, quantitative studies
reveal associative relationships, i.e., observations that conflict are more or
less associated with the existence of certain institutions. These associative
studies themselves can result in misleading conclusions. 14 8
In introducing the taxonomy I do not purport to overcome the problem of proving causation (nor do I intend to address causalities, beyond
merely making preliminary observations from a limited set of data) or to
149
avoid entirely the danger of over-ascribing the effects of institutions.
Because the taxonomy categorizes the cases according to the functions
that U.N. security multilateralism-under the law that created it-is intended to accomplish, it can be used to compare performance under discrete functions across the range of U.N., non-U.N. and unilateral cases.
One way to begin that comparative analysis is to question whether the performance of that function was or was not successful in eliminating or reducing the threat to international security it was intended to address. The
danger of using this as the measure of effectiveness is that it may become
too reductivist, i.e., threats would be traced back to their root causes, and
in each of the cases where violent force is ultimately used, the institutional
function could be deemed ineffective. 150 Nonetheless, it may be a useful
starting point for testing the rationales of security multilateralism. When
evaluating the intermediation function, for example, one clear measure of
effectiveness is the success of the function at achieving pacific settlement.
146. For examples of recent efforts in legal literature, see William C. Bradford, International Legal Regimes and the Incidence of Interstate War in the Twentieth
Century: A Cursory Quantitative Assessment of the Associative Relationship, 16 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 647, 723 (2001); Cuellar, supra note 29, at 220. Both of these studies
acknowledge the limitations of being able to draw conclusive causal relationships
between the incident of war and the existence of a legal regime or institution with
authority to regulate that war.
147. See Keohane, supra note 45, at 738 (explaining that there is no institution-free baseline from which to measure impact of institutions on state
capabilities).
148. See Cuellar, supra note 29, at 223, 225-26 (arguing that increased incidence and intensity of war are associated with post-World War II period). But see
MARSHALL & GURR, supra note 43, at 1 (noting decline in global magnitude of
armed conflict since peak in early 1990s).
149. But many of the functions within the taxonomy-for example, assessment and intermediation-are suitable for qualitative empirical examination
based on the data available from case studies and from the United Nations itself.
150. Further, there is some literature demonstrating that resolution of interstate and intra-state conflict comes most appropriately at a time of ripeness, which
often requires violence to erupt before the parties are amendable to solution. See
generally I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION
IN AFRICA (1989).
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Thus, across cases, we should be able to make limited observations about
whether intermediations emanating from core U.N. functions (e.g., U.N.sponsored dispute resolution processes) are better than non-U.N. or unilateral efforts. The goal here is not quantitative analysis, but rather to
raise questions that can be subject to further empirical testing in future
case studies.
A.

Assessment

Assessment describes the function of information gathering necessary
to the process of determining threats to international peace and security.
Threats have been understood broadly to include any aggressive use of
force, resource and territorial conflicts, human rights problems that may
rise to the level of conflict, ethnic tensions, weapons development, weapons deployment and terrorism. 15 1 Subsidiary organs and committees of
the General Assembly, including the U.N. Human Rights Commission and
various committees set up under several of the international human rights
treaties (e.g., the Human Rights Committee, the Torture Committee), are
empowered to request direct reporting from states, appoint special rapporteurs to perform investigations and, in some instances, take testimony
of states and individuals on issues relating to human rights and human
security. 152

Although not generally viewed as being in direct support of functions
of the Security Council, these investigatory and reporting functions find
their legal basis in Chapters V, VI and VII. 153 These functions are impor-

tant to furthering the general aims
nate threats to international peace
powers, the Council also empowers
cial representatives who can engage

of the U.N. to prevent war and elimiand security. In direct support of its
the Secretary General to appoint spein direct fact-finding missions. 154 The

151. See High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, at 19-20 (Dec. 2, 2004)
(describing range of threats to peace).
152. The assessment functions, though not described as such, have themselves been the subject of empirical study. See, e.g., Philip Alston, CriticalAppraisal
of the United Nations Human Rights Regime, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1, 19-20 (Philip Alston ed., 1992) (analyzing shortcomings of frameworks used to access U.N.'s human rights program); Thomas M.
Franck & H. Scott Fairley, ProceduralDue Process in Human Rights Fact-Findingby
InternationalAgencies, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 308, 311 (1980) (examining fact-finding
practices of several U.N. organs and agencies). For example, empirical examinations of past practices of the U.N. Human Rights Commission reveal significant

bias against Israel and in favor of states that contribute to regional instability such
as the Sudan. See

HARIS

0.

SCHOENBERG,

A

PATTERN OF PREJUDICE: THE UNITED

NATIONS DEAL WITH ISRAEL (1990).

153. For a full discussion of these functions, see supra notes 18-137 and accompanying text.
154. See NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 52, at 72-75 (discussing role of
special representatives); see also Press Release, President, Security Council, Statement on U.N. Special Representative for Afghanistan, U.N. Doc. AFG/148-SC/
7164 (Apr. 10, 2001), available at www.un.org.pk/latest-dev/hq-stmt-011005.htm
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Council can act on its own to establish specific fact-finding mechanisms,
e.g., weapons inspections regimes. The Council is also the locus of direct
state-to-state cooperation and, at times, the direct sharing of intelligence.
While the Council is often put down as a "gab shop," 15 5 the function of
receiving and analyzing data on which it acts is among its most important
15 6
roles.
All of these aspects of the assessment function in principle are designed to overcome-though clearly do not always solve-collective action
problems by promoting cooperation and correcting asymmetries in information. 15 7 By including representatives on the universal membership,
e.g., through the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) organs,
158
the assessment function may help promote legitimacy and fairness.
Perceptions of fairness may in turn affect whether and what action the
Council decides to take on an issue.
B.

Intermediation

Intermediation describes any process of pacific (non-violent) intervention or intercession between parties aimed at resolving ongoing armed
conflict or addressing the threat of conflict. In the context of international armed conflict (both inter-state and intra-state), intermediation has
been used almost synonymously with mediation to describe, third-party efforts in dispute resolution.1 5 9 Here, the term is not used as a complete
(introducing newly appointed Special Representative for Afghanistan); Darrell
Dela Rosa, Self-Determination: The UN Role in Western Sahara, UN CHRONICLE, Vol.
XL, No. 3 (2003), available at www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2003/issue3/0303p22.
asp. (describing Special Representative's role helping people of Western Sahara).
155. See DoRE GOLD, TOWER OF BABBLE: How THE UN HAS FUELED GLOBAL
CHAos

(2004).

156. For a discussion of the U.N.'s assessment of Iraq's weapons program, see
infra notes 269-72 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 25 (discussing cooperation/coordination function of multilateral institutions).
158. Steven R. Weisman, Powell Says More Inspectors in Iraq Are 'Not the Answer,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 15, 2003, at A9 (contrasting international reaction to Colin Powell's presentation and unilateral assessment with presentation and report of U.N.
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) director Hans
Blix).
159. Mediation and intermediation have been defined broadly as the action:
"the efforts of one or more persons to affect one or more other persons when...
the former, the latter or both perceive a problem requiring a resolution"; the object. "any intermediary activity . . . undertaken by a third party with the primary
intention of achieving some compromise settlement of issues at stake between the
parties, or at least ending disruptive conflict behavior"; and/or the process. mediation is "the process by which the participants, together with the assistance of a
neutral person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop
options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that will accommodate their needs." Jacob Bercovitch & Allison Houston, The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence, in RESOLVING
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 13 (Jacob
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synonym of mediation, but rather is intentionally more expansive. 160 In
armed conflict, both people and processes can act as intermediaries that
resolve the dispute or affect positions of the parties. 16 1 Neutrality and im162
partiality are sometimes, but not always, attributes of these efforts.
One type of intermediation process is traditional diplomacy, including the kind of multilateral diplomacy common to the U.N. system, and
other multilateral security organizations such as Organization of American
States (OAS) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as
163
state-to-state or party-to-party bilateral diplomacy and negotiation.
Bercovitch ed., 1996) [hereinafter RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS] (internal
citations omitted).
One explanation of the interchangeability of terms mediation and intermediation is linguistic; the term "mediator" to refer to the person emerged later in
domestic scholarship, whereas the notion of intermediaries, i.e. "go betweens" in
the diplomatic and international context has been around for centuries and has
existed in many cultures. See id. at 12 (discussing P.H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND
NEGOTIATIONS: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES (1979)); see also Barbara Messing, El
Salvador, in WORDS OVER WAR 167 (Melanie C. Greenberg et al. eds., 2000) (referring to U.N.-sponsored peace process in El Salvador as "intermediation").
160. I also want to avoid confusion with the domestic literature on mediation,
which defines mediation more narrowly. See, e.g., JAMES ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2001); LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 196 (1987) (explaining mediation occurs when outside
neutral third party helps others resolve dispute or plan transaction). See generally

Leonard L. Riskin, Who Decides What? Rethinking the Grid of Mediator Orientations,
DisP. RES. MAG., Winter 2003, at 22 (distinguishing domestic and international
forms of mediation). In the international setting, mediation is distinguished from
binding forms of third-party intervention such as arbitration and adjudication in
that it is initiated upon the request of the disputants and leaves the ultimate decision-making power with them. See RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS, supra
note 159, at 12. Because state actors are subject to international adjudication and
arbitration only where they consent, the rationale for considering mediation apart
from arbitration and adjudication is weaker in the armed conflict context.
161. See ZARTMAN, supra note 150; see also INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (I. William Zartman & Saadia Touval eds., 1985); I. William
Zartman, Toward the Resolution of InternationalConflicts, in PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 3 (I. William Zartman &J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., 1997).

162. See William J. Bien, The Oslo Channel: Benefits of a Neutral Facilitator,in
WORDS OVER WAR, supra note 159, at 109, 129 (discussing Norwegian mediation of
Oslo accords, which was viewed as effective because Norway was credible "neutral"
in Israel-Palestinian dispute). Non-neutrals also work, as the case of Richard Holdbrooke acting as forceful "peacemaker" at Dayton. See Melanie C. Greenberg &

Margaret E. McGuinness, From Lisbon to Dayton: InternationalMediation and the Bosnia Crisis, in WORDS OVER WAR, supra note 159, at 35, 65 [herinafter From Lisbon to
Dayton].
163. The Charter promotes traditional multilateral diplomacy in the General
Assembly structure-sovereign equality measured by one state one vote-and the
rotating membership among the ten non-permanent members of the Security

Council. See U.N. Charter art. 18, para. 1 (providing each member of General
Assembly is entitled to one vote); id. art. 23, para. 2 (describing system of nonpermanent member election to Security Council).
Regional organizations are similarly constituted to promote discussion and debate. See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty art. 9, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S.
243 (mandating parties are represented to implement treaty); OAS Charter art. 56,
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Here again, the U.N.'s role as a venue and institutional focal point of diplomacy is of central importance. 16 4 But in addition to traditional diplomacy, the Charter empowers the Council and Secretary General to
appoint special representatives, and convene other ad hoc pacific dispute
resolution efforts. 165 The problem of the permanent veto during the Cold
War contributed to the expansion of such ad hoc efforts at mediation and
66
diplomatic resolution. 1
Intermediation may also occur when the parties themselves agree, either ex ante or in the course of a dispute, to submit the dispute to a neutral
third party to adjudicate the dispute. While binding forms of third-party
adjudication are understood in the domestic context to be distinct from
mediation, 1 67 I include them as part of the process and actors that make
up pacific intermediation in the international context. The parties themselves may agree, for example, to binding arbitration or to seek an advisory
court opinion, or they may be subject to a pre-commitment to binding
adjudication by the International Court of Justice. 168 The important distinction for the purposes of understanding security multilateralism is not
Apr. 30, 1948 (noting all Member States are represented in General Assembly); id.
art. 71 (allowing all Member States to be represented on each Councils of Organization); id. art. 80 (noting Permanent Council of Organization is composed of one
representative of each Member State). Preventative diplomacy has itself become a
separate field of study. See generally CARNEGIE COMM'N ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFINAL REPORT (1997); MICHAEL S. LUND,
A STRATEGY FOR PREVENTATIVE DIPLOMACY (1996).
164. See generallyJohn H. Barton & Melanie C. Greenberg, Iessons of the Case
Studies, in Wopws OVER WAR, supra note 159, at 343.
165. See, e.g., NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 52, at 68-69 (discussing Secretary General's role as mediator and guarantor); Kjell Skelsbaek & Gunnar
Fermann, The UN Secretary-General and the Mediation of International Disputes, in
RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 159, at 75-101 (delineating Secretary-General's role in mediation).
166. See JOCHEN PRANTL & JEAN KRASNO, INFORMAL AD Hoc GROUPINGS OF
STATES AND THE WORKINGS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 15-16 (2002), http://www.reformwatch.net/fitxers/61.pdf (discussing U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) Advisory
Committee in context of Suez Crisis in 1956); id. at 22 (discussing Congo Advisory
Committee in wake of serious tensions at Security Council over what should be
done about crisis in Congo in August 1960); id. at 35 (explaining that Groups of
Friends of Secretary-General formed around specific issue, keep close contact with
Secretary-General, and support his efforts).
167. For a discussion of this distinction, see supra note 165.
168. See U.N. Charter art. 92 (establishing ICJ as principal judiciary of U.N.);
id. art. 95 (allowing member of U.N. to seek justice elsewhere); id. art. 96 (authorizing ICJ to give advisory opinions); see also Statute of the International Court of
Justice art. 59 (mandating that decisions of ICJ only has binding force between
parties of particular case). To the extent the ICJ can provide definitive rulings on
rights and obligations of parties to a dispute, and also say what international law
requires in a certain context, it serves a useful function in promoting peaceful
settlements of disputes.
Recent empirical studies suggest that the reach of the ICJ is, however, limited.
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, A Theory of InternationalAdjudication (Feb.
2004) (Univ. Chic. Sch.,John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 206), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs-201-25/206-eap-jy.
FLICT,

PREVENTING

DEADLY CONFLICT:

PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICTS:
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between binding and non-binding means, but between pacific, consensual
means of reaching peace and coercive and military means of addressing
threats to the peace.
C.

HumanitarianAssistance

Humanitarian assistance refers to the range of activities by outside
parties to a dispute to alleviate human suffering through direct aid and/or
protective services. This is placed in the taxonomy because war always results in some element of human suffering for which mechanisms of multilateral humanitarian assistance will be triggered. Although it is not always
the case that all human suffering is the result of war-see, for example,
the tsunami disaster of 2004 16 9-humanitarian disasters have at times contributed to or exacerbated war. 170 Thus, while there are many U.N. institutions that have evolved to address humanitarian needs generally, almost
all of these institutions have been at one time or another placed into service in conflict situations. Because humanitarian assistance can take place
before, during or after armed conflict, its position in the taxonomy does
not reflect a rigid temporal classification. Indeed, it is the function that is
most likely to overlap with each one of the other functions.
The functions of humanitarian assistance address all forms of human
suffering around armed conflict, food, shelter, medical assistance, refugee
protection and relocation, and in some instances, human rights protection. Almost all of these humanitarian functions are carried out under the
authority of the General Assembly and its constituent organs. 17 ' Non-governmental organizations can also be deployed under contract to Member
States who commit relief money or under contract directly to General Assembly organizations. 172 Humanitarian assistance has also been carried
tribunals.pdf (describing difficulty achieving compliance with ICJ opinions). Indeed, in two of the cases studied here the ICJ played no role.
169. See United Nations Foundation, http://www.unfoundation.org/donate/
undp.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) (providing information about U.N. Development Programme Tsunami Relief Fund). Additionally, providing relief to victims
of the Asian tsunami was a priority at all levels of the U.N. family, including
UNHCR, UNHCHR, UNDP and UNICEF.
170. See Edmond J. Keller, Drought, War, and the Politics of Famine in Ethiopia

and Eritrea, 30J.

MOD. AFR. STUD.

609, 611 (1992) (explaining how humanitarian

crises led to downfall of governments).
171. See G.A. Res. 57, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess. (Dec. 11, 1946) (establishing
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)); see also G.A.
Res. 2816 (XXVI) (Dec. 14, 1971) (establishing office of United Nations Disaster
Relief Co-ordinator also known as UNDRO); G.A. Res. 2029 (XX) (Nov. 22, 1965)
(establishing United Nations Development Programme also known as UNDP);
G.A. Res. 1714, (XVI) (Dec. 19, 1961) (establishing World Food Programme also
known as WFP); G.A. Res. 428, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess. (Dec. 14, 1950) (establishing
office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees also known as
UNHCR); NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 52, at 36-38 (describing roles of
Assembly and its constituent organs in "second generation" peacekeeping).
172. See LARRY MINFAR ET AL., HUMANITARIANISM AND WAR: LEARNING THE LESSONS FROM RECENT ARMED CONFLICTS (OCcASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 8) (1991), avail-
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out under Chapter VII powers, particularly Article 39, although the Security Council has not always been explicit when referring to the authority
under which it is acting. 173 One prominent example is the creation of
UNPROFOR to deliver aid to Bosnia in 1992.174 There, the determination of a threat to international peace and security led not to a military
intervention to alter the balance of force on the battlefield, but rather to
secure delivery of humanitarian assistance in the midst of the war. That
humanitarian assistance mission, in turn, required member states to contribute troops dedicated to protect the delivery of assistance. 175 The first
U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) is another example of the Council using Chapter VII powers in support of a humanitarian mission after
1 76
determining that a threat to international peace or security existed.
D.

Sanctions

Sanctions are non-violent, coercive, collective economic and political
measures taken by the international community to affect the behavior of
states or non-state parties that are threatening international peace and security. 177 Sanctions are the first step in the escalating coercive measures

able at http://hwproject.tufts.edu/publications/electronic/e-op8.pdf (discussing
challenges of humanitarian assistance in war zones). It is common, for example,
for UNHCR to contract with NGOs such as International Rescue Committee to
assist with its protection functions.
173. See Charlotte Ku & Harold K. Jacobson, Toward a Mixed System of Democratic Accountability, in AccoUNTABILITr, supra note 29, at 349, 354 (discussing
Council's failure to be explicit about when it is acting under Chapter VII and/or
Article 39 powers).
174. See S.C. Res. 743, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (Feb. 21, 1992) (creating United
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and referencing powers of Security Council under Article 25 and Chapter VIII); see also S.C. Res. 713, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713
(Sept. 25, 1991) (creating arms embargo on states of former Yugoslavia, and referring explicitly to Council's Chapter VII powers). This explicit reference to Chapter VIII (regional powers) reflected the role of the European Commission (EC)
and the OSCE in the Bosnian peace process at that point. See From Lisbon to Dayton,
supra note 162, at 40-41 (discussing ineffective assistance of UNPROFOR in
Bosnia).
175. See S.C. Res. 743, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (Feb. 21, 1992) (authorizing
United Nations Protection Force).
176. See S.C. Res. 751,
2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (Apr. 24, 1992) (establishing U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I)). This is not to suggest that only
humanitarian crisis arising as a result of or in the midst of war can be carried out
under Security Council authority. Some natural disasters may have a broad
enough reach and impact to be considered threats to international security. See
GA Res. 59/279, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/279 (Jan. 28, 2005) (noting in wake of
Asian Tsunami that addressing natural disasters can "reduce risks to [local populations], their livelihoods, the social and economic infrastructure and environmental
resources").
177. See DANIEL DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS PARADox 2 (1999) (defining economic coercion as "the threat or act by a nation-state or coalition of nation-states,
called the sender, to disrupt economic exchange with another nation-state, called
the target, unless the targeted country acquiesces to an articulated political demand"). The exchange that is disrupted may include "trade sanctions, boycotts,
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of the Security Council. Under Chapter VII, Article 41, the Security Council may take so-called "provisional measures," which include just about anything "not involving the use of armed force." 178 These can include, for
example, severing of diplomatic relations or other procedural sanctions
aimed at isolating one of the parties to a dispute, or a state deemed to be a
threat to peace and security. The intent is to limit or channel that state or
party's engagement with the international community. 179 These diplomatic sanctions can be effectively carried out by the broader U.N. membership through procedural sanctioning at the General Assembly or by
international organizations affiliated with the United Nations. Under
Chapter VIII, the Council can also endorse sanctions brought by regional
organizations.
The more common form of sanctions is an economic and/or military
embargo targeted at one or more of the parties to a conflict or the state
threatening the peace. Examples of this include economic sanctions restricting a range of trade and investment.18 0 Military sanctions most commonly have come in the form of banning sales or transfers of weapons and
materiel.1 8 1 The effectiveness of both economic and military embargoes
has proved to be a rich area of empirical study in the political science
literature.18 2 The legal literature has also looked at the fairness and legitimacy of sanctions, examining, for example, whether sanctions aimed at
states are effective at hurting governments and their leadership or
whether they have the unintended consequence of doing more harm to
individuals (e.g., innocent civilians) who have no power to effect change
18 3
in policy.
aid suspensions, freezing of financial assets, or the manipulation of tariff rates." Id.
at 3.
178. See U.N. Charter art. 41, para. I (mandating Security Council has right to
decide what measures besides armed force should be used to enforce its
decisions).
179. The General Assembly's refusal to issue credentials to the South African
delegation in 1974 is one example of procedural sanctioning. See G.A. Res. 3206
(XXIX) (Sept. 30, 1974).
180. For a discussion of U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iraq, see
supra notes 177-79 and infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
181. SeeS.C. Res. 1160, 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998) (banning
trade of arms with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 757, 4, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/757 (May 30, 1992) (imposing full range of trade, economic, diplomatic and
military sanctions against FRY).
182. See generally DREZNER, surpa note 177.
183. The 1991 UNSC arms embargo against all the states making up the former Republic of Yugoslavia, for example, may have had the effect of locking in
military advantage for theJNA. See, e.g.,
From Lisbon to Dayton, supra note 162, at 4751 (discussing Vance-Owen peace plan for Bosnia that would reward "Serbs with
more land than they had had before war, meaning ethnic cleansing would have
been rewarded . . ."). See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International
Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 83 (2002) (discussing
sanctions in context of response to terrorism); Robert W. McGee, Legal Ethics, Business Ethics and InternationalTrade: Some Neglected Issues, 10 CARDOZOJ. INT'L & COMP.
L. 109 (2002) (discussing ethics of economic sanctions).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss1/12

42

2006]

McGuinness: Multilateralism and War: A Taxonomy of Institutional Functions
MULTILATERALISM AND WAR

E.

Military Intervention

Military intervention describes any outside use of force to address
threats to international peace and security. This is the most controversial
function in the taxonomy. Whereas some of the other functions find authority in multiple provisions in the Charter and within constituting treaties of subsidiary organs, the authority to use force-collectively and on
behalf of advancing the underlying norms of the organization-rests in
one place: Chapter VII, Article 42 specifically empowers the Security
Council-upon consideration that non-military measures taken under the
same Chapter have proven ineffective-to "take such action by air, sea, or
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security." 184 The Security Council has exercised that power in a number of ways-to include advisory functions, protective functions, actual war
fighting and pure post-conflict peacekeeping. Many of the rationales for
unified U.N. command that were discussed at San Francisco-collective
security, burden-sharing and enhanced capacity-went untested as they
1 85
were premised on the existence of the permanent Military Committee.
Blue helmet peacekeeping operations18 6 are somewhat more complicated. In some instances, U.N. deployments that are referred to as
peacekeeping take place when there is no peace to make, i.e., they are
attempts at either conflict prevention or at forcing parties to the table,
more peacemaking than peacekeeping. 18 7 Where peacekeeping serves
solely a policing function and where there is a peace to keep, e.g., after the
signing of a peace agreement, transfer of sovereignty from a prior regime
to a new government or an interim security force while the state rebuilds
capacity after the devastation of war, these are not considered interventions within the meaning of the taxonomy. There is a difficulty here:
there are many instances where the line between the conflict and postconflict phases is not clear. 18 8 Nonetheless, military intervention here in184. See U.N. Charter art. 42, para. 1 (providing these actions may include
demonstrations, blockades and other operations); see also supra notes 114-19 and
accompanying text.
185. See U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 766-75 (discussing Articles 45, 46 and 47).
186. See NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 52, at 16-21 (describing definitional differences between peacekeeping and peacemaking and describing all U.N.
"blue-helmet" peacekeeping missions). For further discussion, see supra notes 12527 and accompanying text.
187. See NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supranote 52, at 20 ("UNOSOM I, deployed
to supervise a cease-fire among Somali clans after the country's government collapsed, proved powerless against them."). The UNOSOM I and II missions were
criticized for precisely this error in mission-peace enforcement cannot be carried
out effectively where conflict still rages. See supra note 176 and accompanying text
(discussing UNOSOM Missions).
188. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address Aboard the USS Abraham
Lincoln (May 1, 2003), available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/05/01/bush.
transcript/index.html (declaring that "major combat operations in Iraq have ended"). President Bush was subsequently criticized for this statement being prema-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006

43

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 12
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: p. 149

cludes any action where troops are deployed, regardless of the offensive or
defensive nature of the rules of engagement governing that deployment.
Included within the function of military intervention are deployments
in which the U.N. does not take action itself, but rather provides implicit
or explicit approval of defensive uses of force that meet the requirements
of Article 51. Also included are actions that are taken by regional organizations under Article 53. Thus comparative examinations of different
types of military interventions would include comparing blue helmet operations under explicit U.N. military command and actions taken by coalitions with explicit U.N. authority with those multilateral actions taken
under Article 53 authority, multilateral actions with no U.N. authority and
interventions completely outside of any multilateral organization and for
which there is no U.N. authority, i.e., ad hoc and purely unilateral uses of
force.
F. Post-Conflict Administration

Post-conflict administration encompasses all non-military measures
taken by outside parties-through occupation18 9 or at the invitation of the
affected state-after the end of hostilities to secure the peace. Security
Council authority under Chapter VII includes all measures to restore
peace and security, which has permitted the U.N. to perform the full
range of governmental functions in a post-conflict context. It has become
the norm in peace agreements to include provisions governing post-conflict administration or transitional authority to bridge the period from
conflict to autonomous, peaceful governance. 190 Many of these post-conflict arrangements reflect the successful historical experiences of the Allies
in post-war Germany and Japan. They also reflect some of the history of
the League Mandates after World War 1.191 Thus, post-conflict administrature. The transfer of sovereignty recognized by the United Nations in June 2004 is

a more accurate, though formalistic, transition date. See S.C. Res. 1546, 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004) (endorsing formation of sovereign Iraqi Government by June 30, 2004). See infra Table 4.4 and accompanying discussion.
189. See Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEo.J. INT'L L. 195, 228-32
(2005) (describing threshold legal determinations of occupation and occupier status under laws of war).
190. See, e.g., Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina-Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina: Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, with Attached Agreed Principles for the Interim Statute for the City
of Mostar, Nov. 10, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 170, 176-77 (1996) (establishing interim municipal governments in new territories).
191. See League of Nations Covenant art. 22, para. 5. (establishing procedure
for mandates). The Mandates carried with them the normative requirement that
the mandate powers promote human rights and the rule of law within the mandate
territories. The Covenant provides:
[T]he Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and

religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the
prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the
liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or
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tion melds ideas of state or nation-building with the protection of human
192
rights norms and broad notions of democratic statehood.
Borrowing from those historical traditions, post-conflict administration has come to encompass almost all dimensions of internal governance,
from providing public utilities, to holding elections, to policing, to establishing or re-establishing functioning judiciaries. 193 The capacities
needed to carry out these tasks are distinct from those required at the
94
military intervention stage. 1
III.

EVALUATING PERFORMANCE UNDER THE TAXONOMY

Having established that the bases and rationales for U.N. security mul-

tilateralism and introducing a taxonomy of the functions of security multilateralism, this section turns to three illustrative cases: East Timor, Kosovo
and Iraq. In each case, the facts are summarized and a description of how
the functions were carried out is presented in table form.
Figure 1 illustrates where each of the three cases falls on a continuum
of legality of outside intervention in armed conflict, ranging from U.N.
multilateral (most lawful) to unilateral (least lawful). While not a perfect
representation of the possible forms of outside intervention into conflict,1 95 the continuum describes the most common legal characterization
of these three cases. A focus on the legality of the decision to deploy force
in an effort to resolve the underlying threat to peace and security tells us
military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other
than police purposes and the defence of territory ....
Id.
192. Indeed, the danger is that an outside power, including the U.N., engaging in governmental functions of a sovereign state may engender feelings of neocolonialism. The push for democratic norms can act to ameliorate these concerns.
See, e.g., Peter Galbraith, The United Nations TransitionalAuthority in East Timor (UNTAET), 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 210 (2003) (describing challenges of balancing
governmental responsibility in post-colonial setting).

193. See, e.g.,

NEw U.N. PEACEKEEPING,

supra note 52, at 169-88 (describing

U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia's (UNTAC) role in post-conflict Cambodia including civil and judicial administration, oversight of elements of national
budget, establishment and monitoring of elections, promotion of human rights,
economic reconstruction and education); Fox, supra note 189, at 201-29 (describing range of U.S. activities in administering Iraq through Coalition Provisional
Authority).
194. I distinguish here between prosecution of war and post-conflict policing.
Where large-scale violence continues, however, it is often difficult to draw the line
between conflict and post-conflict and between civilian policing and military or
paramilitary deployments. Where formal peace agreements have been put in
place, however, or, as in the case of Iraq, a formal transfer of sovereignty has been
made with the approval of the United Nations (shifting legal status from one of
occupation to post-occupation) a line can be drawn that provides a useful, if imperfect, distinction between conflict and post-conflict. That is what I have tried to
do in the taxonomy.
195. For example, it does not account for unilateral interventions that can
more accurately be called "unilateral plus," i.e., two or more states acting outside
either U.N. or regional multilateral authority.
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little about what institutional factors contributed to making outside involvement in a conflict effective. By broadening the view of these three
conflicts to include the range of disaggregated multilateral security functions, the taxonomy is designed to overcome any over-emphasis on the
institutional decision at the military intervention stage and any corresponding under-emphasis or marginalization of the other functions.
FIGURE 1: FoRMs OF

U.N. Multilateral

OUTSIDE INTERVENTION

Non-U.N. Multilateral

East Timor

Kosovo

Unilateral
Iraq

Again, this study does not intend to address the question of whether
the decision to apply outside force in each of the cases was correct as a
normative matter. Nevertheless, normative analyses underlying conclusions about the legality of these cases is helpful in testing the rationales for
outside involvement in each case. These cases were chosen precisely because, at least from a formalist perspective focused solely on the question of
Council enforcement powers, only one, East Timor, should have taken
place under the law. An understanding of the arguments about legality
and illegality is important to drawing conclusions about future reforms,
but it is not necessary to the more limited project of understanding the
comparative effectiveness of unilateral and multilateral efforts.
In addition to representing points along the continuum of international "legality," these cases were chosen to be an illustrative sub-set of
potential cases. This sub-set permits qualitative empirical examination of
a range of cases across one discrete functional dimension. 196 Each also
represents a non-consent based outside intervention into armed conflict. 1 97 In each case, the full range of functions in the taxonomy played a
role.
A.

U.N. Security Multilateralism:The Case of East Timor

The U.N. intervention in the transition to independence in East Timor in 1999 is often described as a paradigm of U.N. security multilateralism.
Tables 2.0-2.4 illustrate how the functions of assessment,
196. Indeed, it was my work on a study for the Carnegie Commission for
Deadly Conflict Series that raised questions in my mind about testing the effectiveness of "functions" served by multilateral organizations in armed conflict. SeeJohn
H. Barton & Melanie C. Greenberg, Lessons of the Case Studies, in WoRDs OVER WAR,
supra note 159, at 343-69 (examining role of mediation and arbitration as means of
preventing deadly conflict). There is no formal controlling for independent variables. I thought it was useful to look at regional diversity as much as possible.
197. I tried to avoid comparing, for example, U.N. efforts in Cambodia and
Namibia (which were consent based) with those of NATO and the United States in
Kosovo and Iraq. See NEW U.N. PEACEKEEPING, supra note 52, at 137-206 (analyzing
UNTAC operations in Cambodia).
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intermediation, sanctions and post-conflict administration were carried
out in that case. The military intervention data are contained in Table 2.0.
A brief summary of the facts of the case follows.

TABLE 2.0: EAST TIMOR: ASSESSMENT FUNCTION

FACT-FINDING BODIES, SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS

1987: U.N. Human Rights Commission East Timor Hearings
1994: Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions 1995, 2002: U.N. High
for Human Rights
Commissioner
19 8
visit

1999: Commission on Human Rights
Special Session 1999: Special Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial, Summary,
or Arbitrary Executions, Torture, and
Violence against women conduct
joint fact-finding mission
GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS

Res. 3485 (1975)
Res. 31/53 (1976)
Res. 32/34 (1977)
Res. 33/39 (1978)
Res. 34/40 (1979)

Res. 35/27 (1980)
Res. 36/50 (1981)
Res. 37/30 (1982)

199

198. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), Sub-Comm. on Comm'n on
Human Rights, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, in
Any Part of the World, with ParticularReference to Colonialand OtherDependent Countries
and Territories, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/61 (Dec. 14, 1994) (prepared by Special
Rapporteur, Bacre Waly Ndiaye) (reporting types of violations that fall within ambit of mandate and emphasizing import of paying attention to violations of right to
life).
199. See G.A. Res. 37/30, 1 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/30 (Nov. 23, 1982) (requesting Secretary General to initiate consultations with all parties); G.A. Res. 36/
50,
4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/50 (Nov. 24, 1981) (noting intiative taken by Portugal); G.A. Res. 35/27,
3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/27 (Nov. 11, 1980) (welcoming
diplomatic initiatives by Portugal); G.A. Res. 34/40,
2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/40
(Nov. 21, 1979) (stating that East Timor must be able to determine its own future
under U.N. auspices); G.A. Res. 33/39, 7 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/39 (Dec. 13,
1978) (reaffirming Res. 3485); G.A. Res. 32/34, 1l 2, 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/34
(Nov. 28, 1977) (reaffirming Res. 3485 and asking Secretary-General for Special
Representative to assess situation in territory); G.A. Res. 31/53, 7 2, 4-5, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/31/53 (Dec. 1, 1976) (expressing concern at Indonesian intervention
in East Timor, reaffirming Res. 3485 and rejecting claim that East Timor has been
integrated into Indonesia); G.A. Res. 3485 (XXX),
1, U.N. Doc. A/2439 (Dec.
12, 1975) (calling upon Indonesia to stop its violation of territorial integrity of East
Timor and calling upon all states to respect right of self-determination of people
of East Timor).
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EAST TIMOR: INTERMEDIATION FUNCTION

Aug. 1998: Portugal and Indonesia

NEGOTIATIONS

agree to begin negotiations on special autonomy for East Timor
May 5, 1999: U.N.-brokered agreement between Portugal and Indonesia calling for Secretary-General to
20 0
hold referendum on autonomy

U.N.

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES

Sergio Vieira de Mello, Sec. Gen. special rep.

TABLE

2.2:

EAST TIMOR: SANCTIONs FUNCTION

SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS

N/A

IFI SANCTIONS

Sept. 1999: World Bank calls on
Indonesian President to honor referendum outcome; IMF suspends economic mission to Indonesia.

UNILATERAL SANCTIONS

Sept. 1999: United States suspension
20 1
of military ties with Indonesia.

200. See Agreement Between Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question of East Timor, May 5, 1999, available at http://www.usip.
org/library/pa/et/east timor_05051999.ques.html (detailing agreement between
Indonesia and Portugal).
201. Other unilateral actions against Indonesia include: 1991, U.S. Senate
and House members adopt declaration on East Timor for incorporation into Foreign Relations Authorization Act calling for suspension of military training program funds for Indonesian government; 1995, European Parliament condemns
continuing military oppression in East Timor and calls on international community (especially the EU member states) to halt arms sales to Indonesia; 1996, European Parliament again condemns the illegal occupation of East Timor and calls for
EU member states to halt military assistance and arms sales to Indonesia.
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TABLE

2.3:

GOVERNING

EAST TIMOR: POST-CONFLICT ADMINISTRATION

MAY 1999-Ocr.

OCT. 1999-MAY

MAY 2002-MAy

1999

2002

2005

UNAMET

UNTAET

UNMISET

National Consultative Council
(NCC), East
Timorese
National Council,
Transitional Cabi20 3
net

AUTHORITY

POLICING

202

U.N. Civilian
Police

JUDICIAL STRUCTURES

U.N. Civilian
Police (CivPol)

Policia Nacional
de Timor-Leste
20 4
(PNTL)

Transitional Judicial Service Commission
(recruitment and

training of
judges)
Mixed panelsinternational and
East Timorese
judges;
Special Department for Prosecution of Serious
Crimes; Commission for Reception, Truth and
Reconciliation

POsT-CONFLICT/

HR ENFORCEMENT

(CAVR)
Ad hoc court in
Jakarta
Community Reconciliation Pro-

cess
ELECTIONS

Popular consultation on offer of
special autonomy
from Indonesia

Constituent
Assemblyelected 08/2001
Presidentelected 04/2002

202. SeeJoel C. Beauvais, Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of U.N. State-Building
in East Timor, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1101, 1127-28, 1151-54 (2000-2001)
(describing UNTAET's period of "co-government" prior to transfer of full
authority to East Timor).

203. The Transitional Cabinet is comprised of five Timorese and four internationals under chairmanship of the Transitional Administrator.
204. PNTL received advice and training from the U.N. Civilian Police.
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TABLE 2.4: EAST TIMOR: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (POST-CONFLICT)
UNAMET
(5/1999-10/1999)

UNTAET
(10/1999-5/2002)

FOOD

Sept. 1999: WFP
begins food distribution.

Jan. 2000: food distribution
shifts to targeted approach
(to prevent food aid dependency); emphasis now
placed on vulnerable
groups, "food for work" and
school feeding programs.

HEALTH

Sept. 1999: First WHO
team arrives in East
Timor (medical and
health assessment mission)

2000: East Timor Interim
Health Authority (IHA) is
established; works in conjunction with U.N. agencies.206

REFUGEES

May 1999: UNHCR
becomes operational
in East Timor; provides assistance to
207
IDPs.

Oct. 1999: MOU between
UNHCR and Indonesia
allows access to refugee
population from East Timor
and provides assurance of

2 05

UNMISET
(5/2002-5/2005)
2003: WFP food aid
intervention
2004: Protracted
Relief and Recovery
Operation

Jan. 2003: UNHCR
declares cessation
clause for East
Timorese
2 0 8 refugees.

I security of UNHCR staff.

205. See U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor, Office of Commc'n and
Pub. Info., East Timor Update 1-2 (Mar. 15, 2000) (detailing number of refugees
who returned to country, number of tons of food that has been distributed and

number of shelter kits distributed to needy families). See generally WORLD

HEALTH
ORG. (WHO), REG'L OFFICE FOR SOUTH-EAST ASIA, WHO COUNTRY COOPERATION
STRATEGY

2004-2008, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE (Apr. 2004), available

at http://www.who.int/countries/en/cooperation strategy-tls.en.pdf (detailing
WHO's humanitarian assistance in East Timor); Disasterto Development: How WFP
Fights Hunger, www.wfp.org/index.asp?section=5 (discussing how World Food
Program fights against global hunger by saving refugees, improving nutrition and
quality of life and promoting self-reliance).
206. See East Timor Update, supra note 205, at 3 (Mar. 15, 2000) (discussing
how IRA is composed of sixteen East Timorese and nine international staff and
has recently been established). IHA works with U.N. agencies and NGO healthcare providers:
[R]ebuilding and rehabilitation [of] healthcare facilities; re-establishing
basic health services throughout the country; ensuring the supply of essential drugs and immunization services; providing training and support
for East Timorese health personnel; maintaining communicable disease
surveillance and improving disease prevention and control; re-establishing the country's laboratory services; and ensuring adequate maternal
and child health services.
Id. at 4.

207. See generally U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, Evaluation of UNHCR's Repatriation and Reintegration Programme in East Timor, 1999-2003, U.N. Doc. EPAU/2004/02 (Feb. 2004) (prepared by Chris Dolan &
Judith Large) (describing UNHCR's contribution to coping with emergency in
East Timor). The three main areas of assistance to returnees are repatriation
(transport, transit, accommodation and non-food items), the Shelter Programme
and the Quick Impact Projects. See id.

208. See U.N. Refugee Agency, East Timorese Refugee Saga Comes to an End, Dec.
30, 2002, at 2, availableat http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/print?tbl=NEWS

&id=3e1060c84 (describing how "cessation clause" is declared for refugees once it
is determined that they no longer have credible fear of persecution upon return to
their home countries and they no longer need international protection).
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Oct. 1999: repatriation
program begins; Mass
Information Campaignsdesigned to encourage
people to return.
Reconciliation activities at
border and support to
CAVR.
Shelter Project-provides
construction materials and
technical guidance.
ICRC and IRC deal with
child refugee issues.
IOM-assists in returns
from West Timor.

ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT

2000: UNTAET receives
grants from Trust Fund for
East Timor (TFET) for
emergency infrastructure
rehabilitation and water
supply and sanitation
209
rehabilitation.
UNDP mobilizes and
coordinates financial and
technical resources,
identifies strategic
development issues and
capacity-building. 210

2003: UNDP moves to
improving the socioeconomic conditions
of the population.

East Timor Summary. In January 1999, representatives of the governments of Portugal and Indonesia began a series of talks under U.N. auspices to negotiate the future of East Timor, a former colony of Portugal
that had been occupied by Indonesia since 1975.211 The government of
Indonesia proposed "special autonomy," which would allow East Timor to
form its own government with legislative, executive and judicial powers,
209. See generally Trust Fundfor East Timor (TET): East Timor Rehabilitationand

Development, Progress Report, Donors' Council Meeting, Lisbon, Portugal, June 2123, 2000 available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/EastTimor/
TrustFund/default.asp#contents (describing rehabilitation projects and strategies
for assistance). TFET is a trust fund that is administered by the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The World Bank is the trustee of TFET.
Donors include: Portugal, Japan, Australia, United Kingdom, Finland, United
States, Ireland, New Zealand, Italy, the European Commission and the World Bank
Post-Conflict Fund. Grants were made to UNTAET for projects that were comanaged by UNTAET and ADB.
210. See U.N. Executive Bd. of the U.N. Dev. Programme and of the U.N.
Population Fund, Country Programme Outline for East Timor (2003-2005), U.N. Doc.
DP/CPO/ETM/1, at 3 (July 29, 2002) (detailing how UNDP helped develop such
areas as electoral and legislative process, civic education, judicial system, audit
system and community organizations).
211. See United Nations and East Timor-A Chronology, http://www.un.org/
peace/etimor/Untaetchrono.html [hereinafter East Timor Chronology] ("Talks
begin in New York between the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General
...and the Directors-General of the Indonesian and Portuguese Foreign Ministries."). For a history of East Timor's struggle for independence following the
1975 Indonesian invasion of the former Portuguese colony, see ANTONIO CASSESE,
SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLEs: A LEGAL REAPPRAIsAL 223-30 (1995).
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with Indonesia retaining military control. 2 12 Portugal made its acceptance
of the proposal contingent on a "popular consultation" process whereby
the people of East Timor would be given the chance to vote to accept
Indonesia's offer of special autonomy or instead claim total independence. 2 13 The U.N. was enlisted to present the autonomy plan to the people of East Timor and to organize and conduct the popular
consultation.

2 14

In May 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan signed the Modalities and
Security Agreements, thereby committing the U.N. to the implementation
of the popular consultation. 2 15 On June 11, the Security Council passed
Resolution 1246, establishing the United Nations Mission to East Timor
216
(UNAMET) in order to prepare, carry out and monitor the election.
The Council stressed that the maintenance of security, to ensure both the
integrity of the ballot and the safety of election workers and observers, was
the responsibility of the Indonesian government; it did not specifically in2 17
voke its enforcement powers under Chapter VII.
In the time leading up to the August election, pro-Indonesian militias
carried out a campaign of violence and intimidation against the citizens of
East Timor that prompted Annan to delay the registration and the vote for
a number of weeks. 2 18 Despite the violence, ninety-five percent of registered voters participated in the consultation, with a majority voting in
favor of independence. 21 9 Violence against the East Timorese by pro-Indonesian militias increased immediately following the election. Reports,
some based on direct fact-finding carried out by the Council, 2 20 estimated
212. SeeJennifer Toole, A FalseSense of Security: Lessons Learnedfrom the United
Nations Organization and Conduct Mission in East Timor, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. Rzv. 199,

214 (2000) (describing how under Indonesia's autonomy proposal, East Timor
could conduct its own elections and create its own law so long as it was in compliance with Indonesian law).
213. See id. at 214-15 ("Portugal agreed to accept the proposal so long as the
people of East Timor could be consulted, by secret ballot, as to whether they
wished to accept Indonesian autonomy or pursue independence.").
214. See id. at 215 (explaining how Portugal and Indonesia requested help
from U.N. on presenting proposal to East Timorese people).
215. See id. ("The Secretary General immediately signed the Modalities and
Security Agreements, expressing the U.N.'s commitment to organize and conduct
the consultation.").
216. See id. (describing how UNAMET registered 451,792 voters in two
months).
217. See S.C. Res. 1246, 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1246 (June 11, 1999) (requesting Indonesian government to ensure popular consultation is carried out in fair
and peaceful way).
218. See Toole, supra note 212, at 216 (detailing how militia beat and tortured
East Timorese people and burned property to ground).
219. See Hilary Charlesworth, The Constitition of East Timor, 1 INT'LJ. CONsT. L.
325, 326 (2003).
220. Security Council Mission, Report of the Security Council Mission to Jakarta
and Dili, 1, delivered to the Security Council U.N. Doc. S/1999/976/Annex (Sept.
14, 1999) (reporting events witnessed in East Timor).
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that more than 200,000 East Timorese were forced from their homes as a
result of the unrest.22 1 On September 15, the Council expressly invoked
its authority under Chapter VII to pass Resolution 1264 which authorized
the deployment of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), a
multinational force under Australian military command, to East Timor
with the mandate to "restore peace and security." 222 On October 25, with
INTERFET on the ground in East Timor, the Council created the United
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which was
to assume interim governorship over East Timor and oversee the transition toward independence. 223 The mandate of UNTAET was broad civil
224
governance.
Sergio Vieira de Mello was appointed Special Representative of the
Secretary-General (SRSG) and Transitional Administrator in November.2 25 Among his first official acts was the creation of the National Consultative Council (NCC) and the Transitional Judicial Service Commission,
both aimed at increasing East Timorese political participation during the
transition. 2 26 De Mello also signed a UNTAET regulation making Indonesian law the applicable law in the territory. 227 The early work of UNTAET
was consumed with the transition of security responsibilities from INTERFET, persistent militia incursions into East Timor, the integration of
East Timorese into civil service and administrative positions within the gov221. See Toole, supra note 212, at 216-17 (noting approximate number of East
Timorese driven from their homes).
3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (Sept. 15, 1999); East
222. See S.C. Res. 1264,
Timor Chronology, supra note 211 (noting INTERFET was placed under unified
command structure lead by Australia).
223. See S.C. Res. 1272, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999) (establishing UNTAET).
224. The Resolution reads that the mandate of UNTAET shall consist of the
following elements:
(a) To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor;
(b) To establish an effective administration;
(c) To assist in the development of civil and social services;
(d) To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance,
rehabilitation and development assistance;
(e) To support capacity-building for self-government; [and]
(f) To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable
development.
Id. 2; see also Galbraith, supra note 192.
225. See East Timor Chronology, supra note 211 (noting date of SRSG's
appointment).
226. The NCC was ajoint East Timorese-UNTAET advisory body charged with
review of UNTAET regulations, while the Transitional Judicial Service Commission
was charged with the recruitment and training of judges. See Beauvais, supra note
202, at 1120, 1153 (describing functions).
227. This regulation defined the applicable law as "'the laws applied in East
Timor prior to 25 October 1999' insofar as they do not conflict with internationally
recognized human rights standards." See id. at 1151 (quoting Reg. No. 1999/1, On
the Authority of the Transitional Administration in East Timor, 1 3.1, U.N. Doc.
UNTAET/REG/1999/1 (Nov. 27, 1999)).
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ernment and responses to the humanitarian disaster resulting from the
violence following the popular consultation. 2 28 Within two years, UNTAET had succeeded in turning over much of the governing functionsincluding judicial functions-to the East Timorese.
On May 20, 2002, after more than two years of U.N. administration,
East Timor gained independence as the "Democratic Republic of TimorLeste." Three days earlier, the Council had passed Resolution 1410, establishing the post-independence U.N. Mission to Support East Timor (UNMISET) with a two-year mandate. Like UNTAET, it was headed by a
SRSG. Its mandate, however, was not actual governance, but to "provide
assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor; to provide interim law enforcement and public [s]ecurity and to assist in developing the East Timor Police Service" and
contribute to the maintenance of external and internal security of TimorLeste. 22 9 Civilian policing and peacekeeping were therefore a large part
of the UMISET mandate; 1,250 civilian police and 5,000 military troops
were assigned to the initial mission. After several extensions of the mandate, UNMISET was replaced in May 2005 by a U.N. Office in Timor-Leste
(UNOTIL), which is mandated through Council resolution to continue
advising the East Timor government on civilian administrative institution
building and police and military matters. Its current mandate expires May
2006.230
B.

Non-U.N. Security Multilateralism: The Case of Kosovo

Kosovo has been characterized as the paradigmatic non-U.N. multilateral intervention. 23 1 The controversial doctrine of humanitarian interventionism-outside use of force based on human rights violations internal to
a sovereign state, even where those violations do not rise to the level of
threats of international peace and security-has also been widely explored
through the Kosovo case. 2 3 2 While this Article does not address the merits

of the doctrine of humanitarian interventionism, the form of intervention
in Kosovo, i.e., a NATO-led multilateral intervention, provides an example
228. See East Timor Chronology, supra note 211.
229. See U.N., Background Paper on UNMISET, http://www.un.org/depts/
dpko/missions/unmiset/background (last visited Mar. 24, 2005) (describing UNMISET's mandate).
230. See UN.Mission in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), http://www.unmiset.org/ (last

visited Aug. 5, 2005).

231. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, The UN, NATO, and InternationalLaw After
Kosovo, 22 HuM. RTs. Q. 57, 57 (2000) (noting that NATO use of force in Kosovo
was inconsistent with express terms of Charter and Security Council practice);
Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR.J. INT'L L. 1,
12 (1999) (stating that NATO airstrikes breached Charter).

232. See generally SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? (2001);
Klinton W. Alexander, NATO's Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Case for Violating
Yugoslavia's National Sovereignty in the Absence of Security CouncilApproval, 22 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 403 (1999);Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of HumanitarianIntervention: Lessons from Kosovo, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1743 (2000).
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of a technically unlawful regional effort at multilateralism against which to
measure U.N. multilateral and purely unilateral efforts. Tables 4.1-4.5 categorize the elements of the Kosovo case into the taxonomy.
TABLE 3.1: Kosovo: ASSESSMENT
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

NATO
United States, European Union

FACT-FINDING BODIES

NATO
ICTY Investigators
OSCE; EC/EU Monitoring Body

TABLE 3.2: Kosovo: INTERMEDIATION

AD HOC GROUPS, FACILITATED NEGOTIATIONS

Contact Group (United States, United
Kingdom, Germany, Italy, France and Russia)
NATO Sec'y Gen.
Rambouillet Talks (Feb. 6, 1999-Feb. 23,
1999)
Paris Talks (Mar. 15, 1999-Mar. 18, 1999)

SECURITY COUNCIL

S.C. Res. 1160; S.C. Res. 1199 (supporting
recommendations of Contact Group)

ICJ

FRY case against Belgium (dismissed without reaching merits in 2003)

TABLE 3.3: Kosovo HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
EUROPEAN UNION

Post-Conflict (under UNMIK)

NATO

KFOR securing delivery of aid post-conflict

GENERAL ASSEMBLY AGENCIES

UNHCR (refugee protection, return and
resettlement); UNDP; Others operating
under the UNMIK mandate

TABLE 3.4. Kosovo SANCTIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS

S.C. Res. 713 (1991) FRY arms embargo
S.C. Res. 1160 (1997) FRY economic
embargo
S.C. Res. 1199 (1998) Arms embargo
(lifted 2001)

REGIONAL SANCTIONS

EC arms embargo (1991)
EC economic sanctions (1998)
Contact Group (plus Canada and Japan)
(1998)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006

55

204

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 12
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

TABLE 3.5: Kosovo POST-CONFLICT

[Vol. 51: p. 149

CIVL ADMINISTRATION

JUNE 1999 - PRESENT
POLICING

S.C. Res. 1244 (establishing UNMIK)

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

UNMIK

INSTITUTION BUILUING/DEMOCRATZATION

OSCE (democracy programs); EU (economic reconstruction)

PHYSICAL RECONSTRUCTION

EU, under UNMIK

JUDICIAL PROCESSES; WAR CRIMES PROSECU-

Sept. 1999: SRSG promulgates UNMIK

TIONS

Reg. 1999/7 dissolving Joint Advisory
Council;
Establishes commission for Appointment
of Judges and Prosecutors (AJC)
Sept. 1999: SRSG creates Technical Advisory Commission
2000: Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes
Court
Broad (KWECC);
cooperation with IC1Y

Kosovo Sumr.tary. The conflict in Kosovo emerged following the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which had
begun in 1991 with declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia,
and later Bosnia and Macedonia. 23 3 War broke out immediately following
the Croatian and Slovenian declarations, and engulfed Bosnia for most of
1992-1995. Although the problem in Kosovo was recognized by the international community as among the tinderboxes that could further inflame
the Balkans, the Kosovo problem was left out of the U.S./EU sponsored
peace negotiations over Bosnia, and was not addressed in the 1995 Dayton
234
accords.
Kosovo had been a fully autonomous republic within the Republic of
Serbia until 1989, when then-Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic revoked Kosovo's autonomy. 23 5 In the following years, ethnic Albanians,
who made up more than eighty percent of the Kosovar population, were
relegated to a second tier society, while the minority Serbs filled all the key
positions in government, education and other public and private employ233. For a discussion of the origins of the conflict, see CHESTERMAN, supra
note 232, at 207.

234. For a further discussion of Dayton agreement, see supra note 190 and
accompanying text. One exception to this was the December 1992 warning from
the U.S. administration to Milosevic that "[i]n the event of conflict in Kosovo
caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military
force against the Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper." CHESTERMAN, supra note
232, at 207 (quoting David Binder, Bush Warns Serbs Not to Widen War, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 1992, at A6). Another exception which would have effect in the postconflict period was the territorial jurisdiction of the ICTY, which included all territories of the FRY. See Statute of the International Tribunal art. 8, May 25, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1192.
235. This status gave it powers similar to the constituent republics (e.g., Bosnia, Croatia and Macedonia). See CHESTERMAN, supra note 232, at 207; Parul R.

Williams & Patricia Taft, The Role ofJustice in the Former Yugoslavia: Antidote or Placebo
for Coercive Appeasement?, 35 CASE W. REs. J. OF INT'L L. 219, 236-37 (2003).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss1/12

56

2006]

McGuinness: Multilateralism and War: A Taxonomy of Institutional Functions
MULTILATERALISM AND WAR

205

ment. In 1991, the Kosovar Albanians declared their independence,
secretly elected a president (Ibrahim Rugova) and created a parallel set of
institutions, all of which went unrecognized by Belgrade and most of the
outside world. During these years, Belgrade kept a tight grip on Kosovo,
while also prosecuting the war in Bosnia.
In 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged as the military
arm of Albanian separatism, engaging in sporadic attacks against Serb officials in Kosovo. The Serbs responded with more repression of student and
other ethnic movements in the region. In fall 1997, violence between Serb
authorities and the KLA escalated. 2 36 Violence escalated further the next
spring after dozens of Albanian separatists were killed by Serbian police.
The Security Council responded by passing Resolution 1160, invoking its
enforcement powers under Chapter VII to condemn the excessive force of
the Serbian police and the terrorist actions of the KLA, and to impose
sanctions in the form of an arms embargo. The Council expressed support for a peaceful solution taking into account broad legal principles of
23 7
territorial integrity and respect for autonomy of the Kosovar Albanians.
As fighting between the KLA and Serbian police and military continued,
the U.S.-led "Contact Group" (United States, United Kingdom, France,
Germany, Italy and Russia) served as an intermediary in peace discussions
between Milosevic and Rugova. 23 8 The talks foundered in May 1998. In
June, the Contact Group joined by Canada and Japan applied additional
sanctions against the FRY.
Intense fighting between the KLA and Serbs continued throughout
the summer, resulting in thousands of Albanian villagers being driven into
the hills, and the discovery of atrocities being carried out on both sides.
On September 23, the Council again invoked its Chapter VII powers when
it adopted Resolution 1199, in which the Council formally determined
that the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to international peace
and security.2 39 The resolution called for a ceasefire, for actions to improve the humanitarian situation and demanded that the FRY implement
the Contact Group statement ofJune 1998: "(a) cease all action by security
forces; (b) enable effective monitoring by the EC Monitoring Mission; (c)
facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons and allow free and
unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies; and (d)
'make rapid progress' towards finding a political solution."2 40 While the
236. In February 1998, U.S. diplomat Bob Gelbard referred to the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) as a "terrorist" organization, which some have interpreted
as emboldening Milosevic. SeeJoanne Mariner, Good and Bad Terrorism?, FINDLAw,
Jan. 7, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20020107.html.
237. SeeS.C. Res. 1160, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998). Despite
invoking Chapter VII, the resolution did not explicitly decide that the situation in
Kosovo represented a threat to international peace and security.
238. See CHESTERMAN, supranote 232, at 208. Most of the actual shuttle diplomacy was carried out by U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke.
239. See S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998).
240. See

CHESTERMAN,

supra note 232, at 208; S.C. Res. 1199, supra note 239.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006

57

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 12
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: p. 149

text of the resolution noted that the Council would "consider further action and additional measures to maintain and restore peace and stability
in the regions," it was deliberately ambiguous and stopped short of a
24 1
threat of military intervention in large part to placate Russian concerns.
Two massacres of Kosovar Albanians by Serbian forces apparently resulted in the hardening of United States and NATO resolve to intervene.
In the face of Milosevic's defiance of the earlier Council resolutions, the
United States called on NATO to act, implying that the legal basis of such
action rested in the prior Council Resolutions. 242 On October 15, 1998,
NATO's political arm, the North Atlantic Council, voted to order an air
campaign in the FRY, with a delayed trigger of ninety-seven hours, in order to give last-minute diplomatic efforts time to work. Two days later, the
FRY agreed to a NATO air verification mission over Kosovo and further
agreed to an Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) verification mission to Kosovo, which included FRY assurances
that it would comply with Resolutions 1160 and 1199. These agreements
were then explicitly endorsed by the Council in Resolution 1203, passed
October 24.243 That Resolution, however, stopped short of authorizing
NATO, under Article 53 of the Charter, to act in support of the Council's
2 44
authority to enforce peace and security.
Intermediation efforts continued at Rambouillet from February 6 to
February 23 of 1999 and again in Paris from March 15 to March 18, but an
agreement was not reached. The FRY rejected provisions that would have
enabled NATO total freedom of movement throughout the FRY and required a referendum on Kosovo independence within three years. 245 After last-ditch ultimatums failed to get Milosevic to agree to the terms of the
Rambouillet agreement, the NATO bombing campaign began on March
24, 1999. The air campaign ceased on June 10, 1999.
On the day of the first air strikes, the Council met in an emergency
session, with Russia, China, Belarus and India indicating that they opposed
the NATO action as a violation of the Charter. Those who supported the
action failed to present a cogent ground for why it might be lawful, 2 46 but

a draft resolution demanding an end to the air strikes was nonetheless
241. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 232, at 208.
242. See id.
243. See S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998). China and
Russia abstained on 1203. Both countries contended at the time that they did not
believe 1203 authorized NATO action. The legal effect of this Resolution on that
subsequent NATO action has been contested. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 232, at
209-10.
244. Nevertheless, the United States viewed the Resolution as giving NATO
the green light to act. See id. at 210 n.335.
245. See id. at 210-11 (describing provisions that FRY rejected).
246. The United States, Canada and France tried to fashion a legal rationale,
stressing that the FRY was in violation of the two prior Council Resolutions, 1199
and 1203. See id. at 211.
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defeated, twelve votes to three. 247 During the remainder of the bombing
campaign, the U.N. was involved in only one substantive issue relating to
Kosovo: a resolution on May 14 regarding refugee assistance. 24 8
In the midst of the NATO bombing, the FRY sought adjudication of
the legality of the intervention by the International Court ofJustice (ICJ).
The FRY sued Belgium, one of the few NATO countries that had agreed to
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, arguing that the NATO air campaign was a violation of the laws of war-both the jus ad bellum, governing
when a State could go to war and the jus in bello, governing how war can be
carried out.2 4 9 The FRY's application to the court was rejected onjurisdictional grounds; there was thus no adjudication of the lawfulness of the
25 0
intervention.
When the bombing stopped on June 10, the Council adopted Resolution 1244, establishing the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK).251 UNMIK, like the UNTAET mandate that came in East
Timor a few months later, had a broad mandate to establish transitional
governance and maintain security in Kosovo. The four "pillars" of the UNMIK mission were organized as follows: (1) Police and Justice, under the
U.N.; (2) Civil Administration, under the U.N.; (3) Democratization and
Institution Building, led by the OSCE; and (4) Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European Union. 252 Bernard Koucher
was appointed head of UNMIK and Special Representative of the Secre253
tary-General, and he retained ultimate authority over all four pillars.
Part of the UNMIK resolution approved the deployment of NATO troops
254
under Kosovo Force (KFOR) to secure Kosovo.
The UNMIK mission was occupied with rebuilding a judicial structure, while also cooperating with investigations into atrocities by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The broad
247. Only Russia, China and Namibia supported the resolution. See id.at 213.
248. See S.C. Res. 1239, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1239 (May 14, 1999).
249. See Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.) (Req. for
Provisional Measures) (Order of June 2, 1999), 38 I.L.M. 950.
250. The ICJ declined the relief sought but remained seized of the question.
See id. 51.
251. See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
252. See U.N. Interim Admin. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Information
Sheet, http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2005). Pillar
one had been "humanitarian assistance" led by UNHCR, but it was phased out in
2000. An excellent account of the post-conflict judicial challenges is Wendy S.
Betts et al., The Post-Conflict Transitional Administration of Kosovo and the LessonsLearned in Efforts to Establish a Judiciary and Rule of Law, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371
(2001).
253. He left office in January 2001; four subsequent SRSGs have rotated
through thejob. Currently, SorenJessen-Petersen holds the position. See Information Sheet, supra note 252.
254. 50,000 NATO troops made up the first KFOR deployment. KFOR had
initial responsibility for all policing. In 2001, civilian policing was transferred to
UNMIK. See Tables 3.1-3.5 and sources.
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mandate of the UNMIK occupation continues in force today. As of this
writing, KFOR remains on the ground providing multinational
peacekeeping.

255

C.

Unilateralism: The Case of Iraq

The 2003 U.S.-led invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq is included in this illustrative comparative examination as the case in which
the U.N. did not explicitly authorize the intervention; indeed, it is broadly
viewed-even by members of the U.S. administration that carried it outas illegal. 256 The United States made clear its intention to act with or
without U.N. authority on the ground that the Iraqi regime represented a
threat to international peace and, more specifically, a threat to U.S. national security. In sharp contrast to the U.S.-led coalition to remove Iraq
from Kuwait in 1991, the 2003 invasion did not enjoy wide support around
the world; to the contrary, many of the closest allies of the United States
opposed the use of force. 2 57 Tables 5.1-5.5 illustrate the Iraq conflict
through the taxonomy of functions. Following is a summary of the facts.

255. See Kosovo Force Information, http://www.nato.int/kfor (last visited
Nov. 11, 2005).
256. The purpose of this discussion is not to resolve the debate over whether

the invasion may have been technically legal on the basis of the Council resolutions governing the coalition ceasefire with Iraq in 1991. For present purposes of
this Article, I am accepting that the basis of the invasion was the threat posed by
the Iraqi government on the basis of its possession of WMD (biological and chemical weapons) in violation of certain prior Security Council resolutions. For the
Bush administration's ex post justification of the legality on the basis of the prior
resolutions, see Taft & Buchwald, supra note 11. Kofi Annan in an interview declared the invasion to be illegal and a violation of the Charter. See Interview by
Owen Bennett-Jones, BBC World Service with Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of
the United Nations, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/3661640.stm.
257. Richard Perle, who had been an advisor to the Bush administration, has
also stated that the war was illegal. See Oliver Burkeman & Julian Borger, War
Critics Astonished as U.S. Hawk Admits Invasion Was Illega4 GuARDIAN, Nov. 19, 2003.
Perle was a member of the Defense Policy Board advising the U.S. Department of
Defense. See id.
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4.1: IRAQ

ASSESSMENT FUNCTION

MAR. 1991-M.AR. 2003

209

25 8

MAR. 2003-JUNE 2004 JUNE 2004-PRESENT

INTLLIGENCE
COOPERATION

U.S. covert operations in Iraq
Iraq Liberation Act (United States
enacts a regime change policy)
(Oct. 31, 1998)
United States works with Iraqi
opposition groups (INC, the INA,
the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI and the
MCM)

United States and
British government
intelligence estimates that Iraq still
stockpiling WMD
(Aug. 2003)

FAcT-FINDING

S.C. Res. 687 (report on steps
taken to facilitate return of all
Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq)
S.C. Res. 986 (establishes review of
"Oil for Food" Program)
S.C. Res. 1284 (fact-finding on
humanitarian issues)

S.C. Res. 1511
(requests United
States to report on
efforts and progress)
U.N. election support fact-finding

INSPECTION
REGIMES

S.C. Res. 687 (triggers ongoing
inspections; Iraq must provide a
list of all weapons of mass destruction in its possession)
IAEA and UNSCOM reports pursuant to 687 (May 1991-Apr.
2004);
UNSCOM reports pursuant to S.C.
Res. 1205
S.C. Res. 1284 (creates UNMOVIC
to replace UNSCOM) (Dec. 1999)
UNMOVIC reporting pursuant to
S.C. Res. 1284 (Jun. 2000-Feb.
2005)
UNMOVIC and IAEA conduct
approx. 750 inspections at 550
sites pursuant to S.C. Res. 1441
(Nov. 2002-Mar. 2003)
Final report of UNMOVIC chief
inspector Hans Blix to U.N. Security Council (Mar. 7, 2003)
1

U.S.-led MNF

1

1

258. For sources of dates, see
SERVICE,

IRAQ WAR:

RAYMOND W. COPSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES OVERVIEW, CRS REPORT 20-21,

available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL31715.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2005);
The Iraq Crisis-Timeline: Chronology of Modern Iraqi History, http://www.mid
eastweb.org/iraqtimeline.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Iraq CrisisTimeline]; see also S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT ON THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ, S. REP.
No. 108-301 (2004); KENNETH KATZMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IRAQ:
U.S. REGIME CHANGE EFFORTS AND POsT-SADDAM GOVERNANCE, CRS REPORT 1, 18,
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/28648.pdf (last visited
Dec. 30, 2005); Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-338, 112 Stat. 3178;
InfoPlease, Iraq War Timeline, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0908792.html
(last visited Sept. 7, 2005); Iraq Watch, http://www.iraqwatch.org/un/Index_
IAEA.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2005) (IAEA reports); Iraq Watch, http://www.iraq
watch.org/un/IndexUNSCOM.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2005) (UNSCOM
reports); Iraq Watch, http://www.iraqwatch.org/un/IndexUNMOVIC.html (last
visited Sept. 7, 2005) (UNMOVIC reports).
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4.2:

IRAQ HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FUNCTION

MAR. 1991-M". 2003

S.C. Res. 688 (humanitarian
issues); Res. 986 (establishes
"Oil for Food" Program); S.C.
Res. 1111, 1143, 1210, 1242,
1280, 1281, 1302, 1330, 1352,
1360, 1382, 1409, 1443 (19972002 extensions of Oil for
Food program)
U.S. Exec. Order creates
Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance,
within the Department of
Defense (Jan. 20, 2003)

PROvISION OF
FOOD, SHELTER,

RECONSTRUCTION

1

_

1

_

__

TABLE 4.3:

ECONOMIC SANG

TIONS

MAR. 2003-JUN. 2004

2 59

JUNE 2004-PRESENT

S.C. Res. 1472
Range of U.N.
(restarted Oil for
development proFood Program);
grams adminisS.C. Res. 1476
tered through
(recalls previous
UNAMI (mission
res. pertaining to
extended in
August 2004);260
humanitarian aid );
S.C. Res. 1500 creDirect U.S. govates U.N. Assistance ernment assisMission to Iraq
tance programs
(UNAMI)
S.C. Res. 1511
(authorizes U.N. aid
to Iraq under U.S.
supervision);
Oil-for-Food program ends (Nov. 21,
12003)
1

IRAQ SANCTIONS FUNCTION

26 1

MAR. 1991-MAR. 2003

MAR. 2003-JUNE 2004

S.C. Res. 687 (continues economic sanctions and boycott)
S.C. Res. 700 (approving
guidelines for monitoring
arms embargo)
S.C. Res. 1051 (approves
export-import monitoring
plan)
S.C. Res. 1134 (threatens further sanctions)
S.C. Res. 1137 (imposes travel
ban)
S.C. Res. 1409 (new procedures that virtually eliminated
U.N. review of civilian exports
to Iraq)

Repeal of unilateral
U.S. embargo (Nov.
2003)

JUNE 2004-PRFSENT

N/A

259. See COPSON, supra note 258, at 17-18, 22-24; KATZMAN, supra note 258, at
39; see also Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Human Rights Concernsfor the 61st Session of
the U.N. Commission, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/10/iraqlO309.htm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
260. These include the full "alphabet soup" of U.N. agencies: ESCWA, FAO,
ILO, IOM, OHCHR, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR,

UNICEF, UNIDO, UNIFEM, UNOPS, WFP, WHO. See S.C. Res. 1546, supra note
188 (extending UNAMI mandate).
261. See COPSON, supranote 258, at 24; KATZMAN, supra note 258, at 15-16. For
more information on this program, see KENNETH KATZMAN & CHRISTOPHER M.
BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IRAQ: OIL FOR FOOD PROGRAM, ILLICIT TRADE,
AND INVESTIGATIONS, CRS REPORT, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/

mideast/RL30472.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
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TABLE 4.4: IRAQ POST-CONFLICT ADMINISTRATION FUNCTION
MAR. 2003-JuN. 2004

POLICING

MNF and CPA carry out policing
with Iraqi support

CIWL ADMINISTRATION

CPA established Apr. 15, 2003
S.C. Res. 1483 (affirms sovereignty of Iraq and recognizes
United States and United Kingdom as occupiers)
U.S.-Appointed Interim Iraqi
Council
S.C. Res. 1511 (recognizing
interim Iraqi government)
U.N. lends election-planning support (Brahimi)
Iraq Governing Council (July
2003)
lyad Allawi designated prime minister of Iraqi interim government
(May 28, 2004)

JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS

Iraqi Special Tribunal established
Interim Constitution

211

262

JUNE 2004-PRIaSENT

NATO pledge aid for training
MNF train Iraqi police
Iraqi government takes over most
civilian policing
CPA withdraws
Sovereign Iraq government institutions
Res. 1546 (recognizes legitimacy
of interim Iraqi government and
calls on U.N. members to support
it)
National Assembly elected Aug.
2004
Council was sworn in (Sept. 1,
2004)

Interim government takes over
Baathist detention and trials

Iraq Summary. The U.S.-led coalition that rolled back the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in less than two months in early 1991 had been expressly
authorized by the Council under Resolution 678.263 Following that military action, Iraq agreed to a ceasefire that was codified in Council Resolution 686.264 What followed over the next twelve years was a series of
Council resolutions taken under its Chapter VII enforcement powers to:
extend economic sanctions, demarcate a final border with Kuwait and create a weapons inspections and reporting regime (UNSCOM);265 demand
disclosure of WMD programs (Res. 707); report IAEA and UNSCOM assessments (Res. 715, Res. 1051); establish the "oil-for-food" program to
limit prior embargoes (Res. 986, 1111, 1143, 1210 and 1242);266 condemn
262. See

KATZMAN,

supra note 258, at 18-19; Iraq Crisis-Timeline, supra note

258.
263. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/peace/docs/scres678.html (noting that this resolution came after application of embargo against Iraq (Res. 661)).
264. See S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 2978th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/686
(1991); see also Letter Dated 3 March 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the
United Nations Addressed to the Presidentof the Security Council,U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
S/22320 (1991), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N91/
072/05/IMG/N9107205.pdPOpenElement (last visited Oct. 6, 2005) (resolving
Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz's acceptance of ceasefire terms under Res. 696).
265. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991),
available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res687.pdf (demarcating final
border with Kuwait, establishing UNSCOM and requiring IAEA reporting on Iraq's
nuclear program).
266. Resolutions 1302, 1330, 1352, 1360, 1382 and 1409 extended and revised
the mandate of the "oil-for-food" program. See S.C. Res. 1409, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1409 (May 14, 2002), available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/resl409.
pdf; S.C. Res. 1382, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1382 (Nov. 29, 2001), available at http://
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Iraq for ongoing violations (Res. 1134, 1137); condemn Iraq for halting
UNSCOM inspections (Res. 1205); and create a monitoring, verification
and inspection commission (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM (Res.
1284). In December 1998 and again in September 2001, United States
and British forces undertook sustained targeted air strikes against strategic
Iraqi targets, on both of these occasions, the use of force was justified on
the grounds of Iraq's ongoing violations of Council resolutions, though no
separate Council resolution was obtained for those actions. Notwithstanding the attacks, Iraq refused to readmit U.N.-mandated weapons inspectors whom it had expelled in 1998.
Following the September 11, 2001 al Qaeda attack on the United
States, the Bush administration made clear that containment of the Saddam Hussein regime was not enough; if Iraq continued to defy Council
resolutions on WMDs, military force should be deployed. The United
States described the Iraqi regime as "a grave and growing danger" in January 2002, and began an open campaign to win support for "regime
change" in Iraq. 26 7 In his address to the U.N. General Assembly in September 2002, President Bush challenged the U.N. to hold Iraq accountable for its violations of the series of Council resolutions passed after the
first Gulf War. Bush made clear that the United States would work with
the U.N. on the threat to peace and security posed by Iraq. But he also
underscored that the United States would act unilaterally if the U.N. failed
to follow the U.S. position. 268 Notably, Secretary General Kofi Annan also
challenged Iraq to meet its obligations under the "mandatory resolutions
adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter ...for
the sake of world order." 269 In response, Iraq denied that it possessed
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, insisted that it had complied with
Resolution 687, but nonetheless agreed to readmit the weapons inspectors
from UNMOVIC and IAEA.
Despite Iraq's readmission of the inspectors, the United States and
United Kingdom pushed for a resolution at the Council that should Iraq
provide false information to the U.N. or fail to allow full access and coopwww2.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res1382.pdf; S.C. Res. 1360, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1360 (July 3, 2001), available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/resoluio/res360.
pdf; S.C. Res. 1352, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1352 (June 1, 2000), available at http://
www2.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res1352.pdf; S.C. Res. 1330, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1330 (Dec. 5, 2000), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
NOO/782/89/PDF/NO078289.pdf; S.C. Res. 1302, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1302 (June 8,
2000), available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/resl302.pdf.
267. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.
html.
268. See President George W. Bush, Address to the United Nations General
Assembly (Sept. 12, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/09/20020912-1.html (noting that United States " [would] work with the U.N.
Security Council to meet our common challenge.").
269. Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, Address to the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 12, 2002).
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eration with inspectors, such actions would be a material breach of Iraq's
obligations under the prior resolutions. Further, the United States wanted
the resolution to explicitly authorize the member states (i.e., the United
States) to "use all necessary means ...

to restore international peace and

security in the area." 270 Other members of the Council opposed the proposal, and instead, they pushed for a resolution that would strengthen the
inspection regime but would stop short of authorizing force. France, in
particular, wanted the Council to meet for a second resolution to authorize force in the event Iraq failed to comply with the new terms. Resolution
1441, adopted under Chapter VII authority on November 8, 2002, was the
compromise. The Resolution noted that Iraq was in "material breach of
its obligations under relevant resolutions" but concluded that Iraq would
"face serious consequences" if it failed to meet the terms set by the
27 1
Council.
UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors returned to Iraq in November 2002,
and on December 7, 2002 Iraq delivered its report on the extent of its past
and present WMD programs. In their reports to the Council in January
2003, the chiefs of the two inspections regimes noted that, while there was
no evidence to support claims that Iraq was rebuilding its nuclear weapons
program and that they could not confirm that prohibited weapons remained in Iraq, Iraq had not fully accounted for all their WMD-related
activities and had not fully complied with the inspections procedures required in the earlier resolutions. 272 Despite these mixed reports, the
United States seized on the reports as evidence that Iraq was not meeting
U.N. requirements and began troop deployments to the Gulf and Kuwait.
On February 5, 2003, with U.S. and U.K. troops amassing on the Iraqi
border with Kuwait and carriers and battleships moving into position, the
Council met to discuss Iraq's compliance with Resolution 1441 and hear
evidence presented by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell intended to
prove that Iraq possessed prohibited weapons and was undermining the
inspections regime. The United States requested that the Council pass a
second resolution expressly authorizing force. When the United States
and United Kingdom failed to garner enough support to carry a majority
(even absent a veto), they abandoned efforts to secure a second resolu-

270. See United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United
States of America: Draft Resolution, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1198 (2002),
available at http://www.un.int/usa/sres-iraq.htm.
271. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002),
available at http://image.guarAian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2005/
04/28/1441.pdf.

272. See Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, An Update on Inspection (Jan. 27, 2003), availableat http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/Bx27.htm;
Iraq Watch, IAEA Update Report for the Security Council Pursuant to Resolution

1441(2002) (Jan. 27, 2003), available at http://www.iraqwatch.org/un/IAEA/iaeaupdatereport-012703.html.
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006

65

214

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 12
ViLLAovA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: p. 149

tion. 2 7 3 In the meantime, however, the United States secured commitments to participate in military operations from its "coalition of the
willing," which, in addition to the United Kingdom, included Australia,
2 74
Poland, Spain and Italy.
U.S. forces began the attack on Iraq on March 19, 2003. Ground
forces entered Iraqi territory on March 20, and by April 9, coalition forces
led by the United States had taken control of Baghdad. President Bush
announced the end of major combat engagements on April 14, 2003, and
put in place the Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA"), which would
serve as an occupation government. 27 5 While many in the U.S. administration opposed any role for the U.N. or for any countries that were not
part of the coalition in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq, President
Bush announced in April that the U.N. would have a "vital role" to play in
276
Iraq's postwar reconstruction.
Acting under Chapter VII, the Council adopted Resolution 1483 on
May 22, 2003, lifting the economic sanctions on Iraq, recognizing the
United States and United Kingdom as occupying forces under international law and establishing a U.N. mission in Iraq that would work with the
CPA on governance and reconstruction issues. 2 77 Kofi Annan appointed
Sergio Vieira de Mello, who had led the successful UNTAET effort in East
Timor, to be Special Representative in Iraq and head the U.N. presence
278
there until a permanent U.N. mission could be established.
On August 14, 2003, the Council passed Resolution 1550, establishing
the U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI). On August 19, a car bomb
was detonated in front of the building housing the U.N. mission, killing de
Mello and 14 other U.N. officials. The U.N. immediately withdrew its mission and did not return a permanent staff presence in Iraq until February
2004.
273. The United Kingdom offered a compromise resolution setting March 17
as a deadline for Iraq to disarm. Germany, France and Russia rejected the compromise resolution and warned the United States not to attack. See CNN, U.S.,
UK., Spain Draft Resolution on Iraq (Feb. 24, 2003), http://www.cnn.com/2003/
US/02/24/resolution.text.
274. For an analysis of additional states contributing troops, see Table 5.1.
275. See Fox, supra note 189.
276. See Judy Keen, Bush, BlairAgree U.N. Role in Iraq "Vital, "Differ on Specifics,
USA ToDAY, Apr. 8, 2003, at A.02.
277. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003),
available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res1483.pdf.
278. The resolution requested that the U.N. Special Representative has responsibility for "coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict
processes in Iraq, coordinating among United Nations and international agencies
engaged in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities in Iraq," including refugee return, working toward democratic governance, physical reconstruction, promoting human rights, rebuilding civilian police capacity and promoting
legal and judicial reform. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1483 (2003), available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res483.pdf.
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Full sovereignty was transferred to Iraq on June 16, 2004 and was subsequently recognized by Council Resolution 1546.279 Elections were held
in January 2005. The United States continues its military occupation, on
the basis of an agreement with the Iraqi government, with over 150,000
troops deployed as of this writing, and maintains a large civilian diplomatic and aid presence that continues many aspects of the CPA and works
closely with the Iraqi government. 280 The U.N., by contrast, maintains
only a few dozen officials in Iraq, and operates a range of programs in Iraq
28 1
out of other offices in the region.
D.

Preliminary Observations

An examination of the case data reveals some interesting preliminary
observations about how the functions of security multilateralism are carried out by the U.N. (East Timor), by other multilateral organizations (Kosovo) and by states acting alone or in ad hoc coalitions (Iraq). These cases
also demonstrate that the labels "multilateral" and "unilateral" are not descriptive of what actually happens on the ground. These observations
serve as potential hypotheses for future empirical studies.
1.

No Case Is Purely Multilateral or Purely Unilateral

The most significant observation drawn from the three cases is that,
despite varying degrees of compliance with international law at the military interventions stage, in all of the cases the full range of U.N. security
multilateralism functions played an important role. That is, by drawing
out the timeline to include assessment, humanitarian assistance and intermediation in all the cases, the U.N. role looms large. Indeed, the U.N.
played a much larger and more sustained ongoing role in the pre-military
intervention phase in the case of Iraq (the most "unilateral" military intervention) than in East Timor or Kosovo. That may be accounted for by the
fact that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was in many ways connected to the 1991
war against Iraq and to the restrictions placed on Iraq as a condition of the
1991 ceasefire (no-fly zones, inspections regimes). Nonetheless, in looking at how the U.N. performed those functions, particularly the assessment and sanctions functions, the result is mixed. The U.N. did quite well
in maintaining the sanctions regime despite the scandals surrounding the
279. See S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. SCOR, 4987th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546
(2004), available at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res1546.pdf.
280. See Michael O'Hanlon & Adriana Lins de Alburquerque, Brookings Inst.,
Iraq Index Archive: Tracking Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, at 14, avaliable at www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/indexarchive.htm (last visited Sept. 7,
2005) (stating number of civilian U.S. contractors); id. at 19 (stating number of
Multinational Force troops deployed); see also SECTION 2207 REPORT ON IRAQ RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION (Oct. 25, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/p/
nea/rls/rpt/2207/oct2005/pdf.
281. Many of the U.N. programs were relocated to Amman, Jordan. See U.N.
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), About UNAMI, http://www.uniraq.org/
aboutus/unct.asp?pagename=unct (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
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oil-for-food program; what the coalition forces discovered, or failed to discover, about the Iraqi weapons program and the capacity of Iraq to pose a
military threat in essence confirmed the results of the joint UNMOVIC/
IAEA inspections. On the other hand, the U.N. human rights assessment
mechanisms failed to capture the full extent of human rights atrocities
28 2
committed by the Iraqi regime.
The most important observation about Iraq is that, despite the unilateral or ad hoc nature of the military intervention phase, Iraq was a core
focus of the Council's enforcement powers for over a decade. During that
same period, there was no other state-at least no state that was not inflamed in civil war-that received the same level of attention or was subject to more economic sanctions, political oversight or outside
intervention than Iraq. Further, Iraq demonstrates that while the military
intervention was overwhelmingly (ninety percent) a U.S. operation, it did
include troops from a larger number of states than either East Timor or
Kosovo. The picture that emerges from the disaggregated Iraq case is
therefore more mixed than the narrow view of whether the military intervention itself was multilateral.
East Timor, in contrast, reveals that what is viewed as paradigmatically
multilateral has been largely affected by bilateral (East Timor/Indonesia;
East Timor/Portugal) relations with the former occupying powers and regional participation in the post-independence phase. One example of this
is the failure of Indonesia to fully cooperate in prosecution of Indonesians
responsible for atrocities committed during the violence of 1999. On the
peacekeeping side, the "universality" of U.N. security multilateralism is in
little evidence in the case of East Timor. Troops have been contributed to
the UNTAET and UMISET military missions largely from states in the region (Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Philippines, New Zealand,
Bangladesh) and from the former colonial power, Portugal. In terms of
post-conflict justice, the U.N. has failed in East Timor to establish an international tribunal to prosecute atrocities committed by the Indonesian
283
government.
Kosovo, by contrast, appears to be the most internationalized in terms
of the post-conflict prosecution of war crimes as marked by its broad cooperation with the ICTY. For example, Kosovar Prime Minister Ramush
Haradinaj resigned his position after he was indicted by the ICTY for his
282. This was largely due to the ability of the Iraqi regime to block efforts to
send U.N. human rights investigators into Iraq. See, e.g., U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L
DEV., IRAQ'S LEGACY OF TERROR: MAss GRAvEs 2-3 (Jan. 2004), available at http://
, ,w.usaid.gov/iraq/pdf/iraq-mass-graves.pdf (describing post-invasion unearthing of over 270 mass graves with remains of over 400,000 people, and noting inability of U.N. and human rights NGOs to gain access to these sites during Saddam
Hussein regime).
283. See Seth Mydans, East Timor Atrocities Will Go Unpunished, INT'L HERALD
TRuB., May 11, 2005, availableat http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/10/news/
timor.php.
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actions as commander of the KLA. 28 4 Thus, Kosovo appears, along the
measure of multilateralism as conforming to a set of universally recognized principles of justice, to be somewhat more "multilateral" than East
Timor.

284. In March 2005, he surrendered himself to the tribunal at the Hague and
pleaded not guilty to all thirty-seven counts in the indictment. See Overview of
Court Proceedings Haradinaj Case, available at http://www.un.org/icty/news/
Haradinaj/haradinaj-cp.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2005); see also Case Information
Sheet Haradinaj et al. Case (IT-04-84), available at http://www.un.org/icty/
glance/haradinaj.htm.
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Whether the Military Intervention Phase Is U.N. or Non-U.N. Has Little
Bearing on the Form and Composition of the Military Operation
TABLE

5.0:

COMPARING MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE CASES
EAST TIMOR

Kosovo

2 85

IRAQ

INITIAL CONFLICT
PHASE (DATES)

Sept. 1999-May 2002

Mar. 1999-June 1999

Mar. 2003June 2004

TYPE
TITLE OF OPERATION

U.N.
INTERFET Sept. 1999Oct. 1999
UNTAET Oct. 1999May 2002

Regional
Operation
Allied Force

Ad hoc
Operation Iraqi
Freedom

COMMAND STRUCTURE

UNAMET: U.N.
MNF (Res. 1270): Aus.
UNTAET: U.N.
INTERFET: 22
UNTAET: 28
Australia

NATO

United States

13

48

United States

United States

INTERFET: 5,500 (65)
UNTAFT: 1,667 (23)

23,208 sorties (62)

423,998 (90.1)

France 2,414 (6)
U.K 1950 (5)
N.D. 1252 (3)
Italy 1081 (2.9)
Germany 636 (1.7)287
Others (19.4)

U.K. 40,906 (8.75)
Others (1.15)288

TOTAL # OF STATES
LEAD STATE
TROOPS COMMITTED BY
LEAD/ (AS PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL)

OTHER STATES TROOP
COMMIT-MENTS/ (AS
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL)

(as of Mar. 2000)

UNTAET:
Thailand 912 (12)
Portugal 750 (10)
Jordan 705 (9.8)
N.Z. 650 (9.2)
Philippines 620 (8)
Bangladesh 530_C7)
All Others (21)

The legitimacy and fairness rationales for collective military action
under U.N. auspices might suggest that U.N. operations are more likely to
attract broader participation in and diversity of troop deployment than
285. See Steve Bowman, Kosovo and Macedonia: US. and Allied Military
Operations, CRS Issue Brief For Congress (July 8, 2003), available at http://www.
usembassy.it/pdf/other/IB10027.pdf; O'Hanlon & de Alburquerque, supra note
280; see also Allan Hawke, Austi. Sec'y of the Dep't of Def., Address to the United
Services Institute (Feb. 2, 2000), available at www.defence.gov.au/media/speech
Tpl.cfm?currentld=920; European Contributionsto Operation Allied Force: Implications
for Transatlantic Cooperation http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2003/03/
20030321; U.N. Transitional Admin. in East Timor, Office of Comm'n and Pub.
Info., East Timor Update, (May-June 2000), available at http://www.un.org/peace/
etimor/untaetPU/ETupdateMGE.pdf [hereinafter East Timor Update].
286. See East Timor Update, supra note 285. Other States and the number of
troops they contributed are: Bolivia, 2; Brazil, 57; Canada, 150; Chile, 25; Denmark, 4; Egypt, 75; Fiji, 180; France, 3; Ireland, 33; Kenya, 200; Malaysia, 20; Nepal,
4; Norway, 4; Pakistan, 130; Russia, 2; Singapore, 20; S. Korea, 400; Sweden, 2;
U.K., 4; Uruguay, 5; United States, 3.
287. See John E. Peters et al., European Contributions to Operation Allied Force:
Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation (2001), http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1391/.
288. See T. Michael Moseley, USCENTAF, Operation Iraqi Freedom-By the
Numbers, Assessment and Analysis Division (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/uscentaf oifreport_30apr2003.
pdf.
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unilateral or regional efforts. These cases appear to refute that hypothesis. Table 6.0 illustrates this point. The pure U.N. operation, East Timor,
went through three different military command structures-U.N., Australian and back to U.N. Kosovo remained a NATO command operation
throughout. Iraq was and remains a U.S. command operation. As measured by the number of states contributing troops, the NATO operation was
the least diverse, East Timor the second most diverse and Iraq the most
diverse. 28 9 But measured in terms of burden sharing,Kosovo was the most
diverse, that is, the burden of troop coverage was more equally dispersed
among the contributing states. The INTERFET operation in East Timor
was also somewhat more dominated by the leading troop contributor
(65% Australian) than Kosovo was by the United States (62%).290 Iraq
was the most dominated by the leading troop-contributing state, with
90.1% of the troops contributed by the United States.
There is little or no evidence to suggest that the troop command
structure and deployments for Kosovo and Iraq would have been any different had the Security Council authorized those two operations. In Kosovo, NATO was in the best position to be effective in the military
intervention phase, for many of the same military reasons that NATO took
the lead in the only military intervention that proved ultimately successful
in Bosnia. In fact, NATO, under U.S. leadership, was also key to the intermediation phase, in that only the threat of NATO intervention was a credible coercive tool to get Milosevic to the negotiating table. Even if the
Council had expressly authorized the intervention, the form of the military intervention phase would not have been any different; it would have
been a NATO operation and thus under NATO rules of engagement.
Similarly, all evidence suggests that the Iraq operation would have
been substantially similar in composition to the 1991 intervention, with
the United States taking the lead and the United Kingdom serving as second coalition partner. 29 1 Thus, the objections to Iraq on the grounds that
U.S. troops made up 90% of the "coalition of the willing" are not
grounded in an argument that rests on either military effectiveness or any
requirement under U.N. practice for diversity of troops. 29 2 Moreover,
289. Of course, the United States counted very small troop contributions in
the total number of states participating in the coalition, and included troops in
non-combat roles.
290. The fact that Kosovo was an air campaign makes comparisons with
ground operations or mixed ground/air operations difficult. Sorties were chosen
as a data point to reflect a rough measure of diversity and state participation. See
Table 5.0.
291. Had they supported the 2003 invasion, France and Germany may have
contributed some troops and funding, but it would not have made a material difference on the overall numbers.
292. Indeed, diversity of nationalities of troops at the military intervention
and post-conflict stages can be problematic. See, e.g., Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, Multinational Land Force Interoperability: Meeting the Challenge of Different Cultural Backgrounds
in Chapter VI Peace Support Operations,J. CONFLICT STUD., Spring 2003, at 60.
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these "coalitions of the willing" that are observed in all cases appear to be
29 3
exactly what was contemplated by the Charter.
3.

Control of the Military Intervention Phase May Determine Control in the
Post-Conflict Peacekeeping and Policing

These cases further demonstrate that there is a certain degree of
"path dependence" in military interventions. 2 94 Once troops are on the
ground to prosecute the war or bring about peace, they are likely to stay
on the ground in much the same form. Kosovo is a somewhat unique case
because the military intervention phase was carried out as an air campaign. Across the three cases, however, the form of the military intervention affected the form of the post-conflict peacekeeping phase. East
Timor began as a U.N. operation, and continued as a U.N. operation postconflict. Kosovo began as a NATO operation, and remained a NATO
peacekeeping operation, albeit operating next to a U.N. civilian authority.
In East Timor, between the conflict phase and the post-conflict phase, the
number of troop-contributing states was reduced from twenty-eight to sixteen. Australia remained, however, the leading troop contributor.
This has important implications for planning future interventions,
particularly where the military intervention, as in Kosovo and Iraq, was
forcibly resisted by one or more of the parties to the underlying conflict.
The party objecting to the presence of the outside interveners will likely
continue to object to the presence of those same outside interveners postconflict. Where neutral, disinterested parties serve as police and
peacekeepers, there may be less resistance to implementation of the
peace, but the path dependence problem suggests that a change in partici29 5
pants is difficult to achieve.

293. For a discussion of multilateralism in armed conflict, see supra notes 18136 and accompanying text.
294. Path dependence originated in the economics literature to describe the
process whereby even seemingly insignificant historical events can "lock in" or affect future outcomes. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence,
Lock-in and History,J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 1 (1995).
295. A good example of effective neutral peacekeepers is the Sinai Multinational Force and Observer Mission, which operates under a unique, non-U.N. mandate to monitor Egyptian and Israeli compliance with the 1978 Camp David
Accords. See Camp David Accords (Sept. 17, 1978), available at http://usinfo.state.
gov/mena/ArchiveIndex/TheCampDavidAccords.html.
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TABLE 5.1: POST-CONFLICT MILITARY OPERATIONS

POST CONFLICT DATES
NAME OF POsT-CON.
FLICT OPERATION
COMMAND STRUCTURE

EAST TIMOR
May 2002-Present
UNMISET
U.N.

Kosovo
June 1999-Present
KFOR
UNMIK
KFOR: NATO

221

29 6

IRAQ

June 2004-Present
MNF in Iraq
United States

UNMIK U.N.
TOTAL

# OF STATES

Li.Ai MILITARy

AND

OTHER TROOPS COMMCTED/ (PERCENTAGE
OF OVERALL PRESENCE)

16
Aust. 881 (19)
Japan 650 (14)
Portugal 647 (14)
N.Z. 614 (13)
Thailand 498 (11)
S. Korea 4372 9 7(9)
Others (20)

37
KFOR
United States 5,400 (14)
Italy 4,750 (12.5)
France 4,700 (12)
Ger.3,900 (10)
U.K. 3,300 (8.6)
Russia 3,200 (8.4)
Others (34.5)298
UNMIK POLICE
2003

28
United States
148,000 (84)
United Kingdom
10,000 (5.7)
S. Korea 3,597 (2)
Italy 3,359 (1.9)
Poland 2,359 (1.3)

United States 399-522

Others (3.4)3

Ukraine 1,587
(0.9)

ND 1405 (0.8)00

India 341-499
Jordan 411-426
Germany 329-363299

296. See UNMISET, United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (2005),
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/; see also Kosovo
Force (KFOR), http://www.nato.int/kfor; U.S. Dep't of Def., Iraq Year in Review:
2004 Fact Sheet (Jan. 21, 2005), available at http://www.defendamerica.mil/down
loads/MNFI-Year-in-Review_2004-Fact-Sheets.pdf.
297. Contributions as of 31 October 2002. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor available at http://
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO2/675/89/IMG/NO267589.pdfPOpen
Element. As reported by the Secretary-General, other states include: Bangladesh,
7; Bolivia, 2; Brazil, 86; Denmark, 4; Egypt, 2; Fiji, 188; Ireland, 4; Kenya, 2; Malaysia, 36; Mozambique, 2; Nepal, 13; Pakistan, 127; Philippines, 64; Russian Federation, 2; Singapore, 225; Slovakia, 36; Sweden, 2; Turkey, 2; Uruguay, 3; Yugoslavia,
3.
298. Other states include: Argentina, 113; Austria, 480; Azerbajian, 34;
Belgium, 700; Bulgaria, 50; Canada, 50; Czech Republic, 200; Denmark, 700; Estonia, 50; Georgia, 34; Greece, 1,500; Hungary, 322; Iceland, 50; Ireland, 104; Jordan, 100; Latvia, 50; Lithuania, 50; Luxembourg, 50; Morocco, 400; Netherlands,
550; Norway, 900; Poland, 750; Portugal, 329; Slovakia, 40; Spain, 1,100; Sweden,
750; Switzerland, 134; Turkey, 948; Ukraine, 300; United Arab Emirates, 1,100.
Steve Bowman, Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations, CRS Issue
Brieffor Congress (July 8, 2003), available at http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/IB
10027.pdf.
299. Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, March 2003; June 2003; September 2003, available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep03.html. Other states include: Argentina, 139147; Austria, 39-44; Bangladesh, 74-84; Belgium, 1; Bulgaria, 86-99; Cameroon, 20;
Canada, 10-22; Czech Republic, 9-16; Denmark, 26-29; Egypt, 60-66; Fiji, 31-34; Finland, 23-34; France, 78-87; Ghana, 31-84; Greece, 18-20; Hungary, 5; Iceland, 1;
Italy, 54-58; Kenya, 44; Kyrgyzstan, 4; Lithuania, 8-9; Malawi, 17-21; Malaysia, 17-46;
Mauritius, 5; Nepal, 36-38; Nigeria, 26-86; Norway, 19-27; Pakistan, 182-194; Philippines, 61-62; Poland, 122-124; Portugal, 15-20; Romania, 175-183; Russian Federation, 118-126; Senegal, 16; Slovenia, 15; Spain, 11-128; Sweden, 4042; Switzerland,
9-11; Tunisia, 4-6; Turkey, 161-165; U.K., 128-133; Ukraine, 185-193; Zambia, 6-31;
Zimbabwe, 37-64.
300. See U.S. Dep't of Def., Iraq Year in Review: 2004 Fact Sheet (Jan. 21, 2005),
available at http://www.defendamerica.mil/downloads/MNFI-Year-in-Review-
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Iraq is most striking in this regard. There, the "post-conflict" phase is
ongoing, and includes major military actions by the U.S.-led Multinational
Forces ("MNF") against a violent and active insurgency. 30 1 The initial reason why the United States failed to "internationalize" the post-invasion
phase was political opposition within the United States, fueled by bitterness over France and Germany's successful blocking of the second Council
resolution that would have authorized U.S. action. Practical considerations of command structure, familiarity with the theater of operations and
troop rotation and training have also played into the decision to keep the
troops who prosecuted the military intervention on for the peacekeeping
and policing phase. The level of post-invasion violence-at times more
fierce than the initial battles that secured the occupation-has also left
even prior coalition partners with little domestic support for troop deployments30 2 and weakening domestic support in the United States. 30 3 This
opposition, ironically, has come at the phase of the intervention that has
30 4
been at least formally legitimated by Security Council resolution.
4.

Whether U.N. Security Multilateralism Confers Legitimacy Varies Across
Function and Time

Each of the cases demonstrates that the legitimacy and fairness rationale for preferencing U.N. security multilateralism is vulnerable. 30 5 The
cases further demonstrate that the process of securing a Security Council
resolution-even one adopted under Chapter VII enforcement powersmay not confer automatic legitimacy. At the same time, those functions
that were performed outside the U.N. and without U.N. authority did not
automatically become "illegitimate."
In the case of Kosovo, an international commission ofjurists has concluded that the NATO bombing campaign was illegal but legitimate, on
the grounds of near-universality of support, the humanitarian values at
2004-Fact-Sheets.pdf. Other states include: Romania, 744; Japan, 565; Bulgaria,
470; Denmark, 392; El Salvador, 381; Australia, 335; Hungary, 301; Georgia, 161;
Azerbaijan, 151; Portugal, 135; Mongolia, 132; Latvia, 120; Lithuania, 115;
Slovakia, 103; Czech Republic, 98; Albania, 72; Estonia, 47; Macedonia, 33; Kazakhstan, 30; Moldova, 12; Norway, 10.
301. See O'Hanlon & Lins de Alburquerque, supra note 285, at 15 (estimating
strength of insurgency in Iraq as growing 5,000 in November 2004 to 15,000-20,000
in June 2005).
302. For an example of this, see Spain and the United Kingdom.
303. See, e.g.,

PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD

2005 (Nov.

2005), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/263.pdf (opinion poll
showing forty-eight percent of American public support Iraq war, forty-four percent oppose).
304. Of course, many of those who opposed the 2003 invasion as illegal do
not view ex post endorsements of the occupation as conferring any additional
legitimacy.
305. I use legitimacy to mean the creation of a process and result that is
viewed as neutral and fair. For a discussion of fairness and legitimacy in multilateralism, see supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
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stake and the fact that a multilateral organization grounded in its own
normative principles carried out the intervention.t1 6 In effect, many of
the same scholars who ground the legitimacy of the aggregation of the
Council's binding authority to decide questions of security multilateralism
in the fairness and neutrality that the law confers found themselves arguing that this kind of legitimacy could be conferred outside of the Council
context.
First, legitimacy in Kosovo is conferred by NATO itself, a security multilateral organization that follows Ruggie's multilateralism definition:
three or more states coordinating their actions according to a set of principles. For NATO, the principles around which the actions of the members
are coordinated are identical to the U.N., save one-universality. 30 7 Because its membership is non-universal, it cannot be said to gain legitimacy
from membership.30 8 On the other hand, the fact that democratic governance was a pre-requisite to membership arguably lends NATO a kind of
political legitimacy absent in the universal membership of the U.N.3 09
Second, legitimacy was conferred by the broad support of world opinion
behind the intervention, even with three votes at the Council going
against it. Third, the prior and subsequent involvement of the U.N. lent it
legitimacy. Setting aside the argument that Resolution 1203 could be construed as conferring formal legality on the NATO action after the fact,3 10
306. See Kosovo REPORT, INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm. Other observers have reached the same conclusion, and
international law scholars have struggled to find a way to argue that, because it was
legitimate, it reflected a new, emerging norm in international law. See, e.g., Ruth
Wedgwood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 828 (1999).
307. The North Atlantic Charter borrowed liberally from the U.N. Charter in
those portions governing the collective security relationship. As Ruggie notes:
There was a direct path from the negotiations over Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, endorsing an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, to the drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty. The same cast of characters who negotiated the U.N. provision at San Francisco, GladwynJebb
on the British side and Senator Arthur Vandenberg on the American
side, also sought to ensure that the North Atlantic Treaty would be compatible with it. That accomplishment allowed the United States to operate "within the Charter, but outside the [Soviet] veto," as the Senator
liked to say. What is more, Article 51 was not drafted with a future NATO
in mind; it was instigated by the Latin Americans to allow for a Latin
American regional security organization that was beyond the reach of a
U.S. veto in the U.N. Security Council.
MULTILATERALISM MATTERS, supra note 16, at 589 (citations omitted).
308. Indeed, it was, prior to the post Cold War enlargement program, inten-

tionally limited to the United States, Canada and the Western European states as a
working alliance to balance the threat of the Soviet Union.
309. See, e.g., Helene Sjursen, On the Identity of NATO, 80(4) INT'L ArF. 687-703
(July 2004).
310. This is an argument that has no basis in the text of Article 53, which does
not contemplate ex post legalization of regional efforts.
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legitimacy and legality, as the Commission concluded, may derive from
sources outside the Charter.
Kosovo demonstrates that the "legitimacy-enhancing" rationale of current U.N. security multilateralism may be over-valued. From these cases
one can observe that actual effectiveness in rolling back the threat to
peace and security results in legitimacy-perhaps even more so than legitimacy or perceptions of legitimacy results in effectiveness. Here, the effectiveness of the NATO air campaign led to the later Council resolutions
and the willingness of the U.N. to take up the lead in the post-conflict
phase. 31 1 This stands in stark contrast to Iraq, where uncertainty about
the nature of the ongoing threat to peace and security and the significant
instability following the initial military phase led to a reluctance of further
international involvement.
In East Timor, the initial intervention, the elections and the transition
to independence were all successful and welcomed internationally. The
presence of the U.N. in each of these processes conferred a legitimacy that
outside powers acting alone (e.g., the United States as close ally of the
former colonial government) could not have done. But the U.N. operation came under fire as it grew from a necessary intervention to supervise
the transition to nation building and judicial institution building. The
longer any outside post-conflict administration plays a role in core aspects
of civil society such as judicial processes, the more the outside actor appears to lose legitimacy. This appears to be the case, as in East Timor,
even where the post-conflict operation is founded on broadly supported
Security Council resolutions that ground the U.N. civil administration in
the law of the Charter. Similarly, in Kosovo six years on, with Kosovo remaining under international administration and violence between Serbs
and Albanians on the rise, legitimacy of the NATO peacekeeping and U.N.
3 12
civilian mission is being questioned.
In Iraq, the converse is observed. The decision of the United States to
intervene without U.N. authority has gained some degree of legitimacy
following the Iraqi elections of January 2005 and the adoption of the new
311. One way to illustrate this point is through this counter-factual: NATO
begins a bombing campaign against Belgrade and Yugoslav targets in Kosovo.
Things go terribly wrong. Blocks of civilian housing are destroyed in Belgrade and
bombings wipe out civilians on the ground in Kosovo indiscriminately. Rather
than rally to remove Milosevic, Yugoslav public opinion is hardened against NATO
and the United States. Even the Kosovar Albanians begin to question the campaign. Would the U.N. have authorized further NATO activities under a Chapter
VII resolution? Would the international commission have concluded that the action was "illegal" but "legitimate"? The answer to those questions is undoubtedly
no.
312. See Nicholas Wood, Ambitious Experiment Leads Kosovo to a Crossroads,N.Y.
Oct. 3, 2005, at A3 (noting criticism that "the very presence of the United

TIMES,

Nations mission, past a certain point, delayed the maturing of Kosovo's own governing bodies").
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Iraqi Constitution by popular referendum in October 2005.313 Though at

the time of this writing the legitimacy was fragile and contingent on a
number of factors (including, for example, the ability of the Iraqi Special
Tribunal to provide fair and impartial trials of Saddam Hussein and former members of his government for crimes committed during the
Baathist regime), this legitimacy was founded not in the procedural neutrality of the decision to invade (which was decidedly not a neutral decision) but in the ability of the intervention to create substantive legitimacy.
Success, it seems, not only breeds success, but in the case of international
security, breeds legitimacy. In other words, legitimacy is not fixed at the
point of Council authorization under its enforcement powers, but is itself
31 4
a function of the effectiveness of the intervention.
5.

The U.N. Has ComparativeAdvantage in Assessment, Sanctions and Civil
Administration

As the debate in early 2005 over whether and how much to intervene
in the Darfur demonstrates, the Security Council process is not particularly well-suited to the deployment of force in response to fast-moving crises. Only when an interested state or group of states brings its own
strategic interests and a commitment to contribute troops to the workings
of the Council, does it tend to act. This problem can be traced directly to
the failure to establish a military committee as originally envisioned in the
Charter as well as the mixed political-legal nature of Council decision-making.3 1 5 As the cases of Kosovo and Iraq demonstrate, military interventions by ad hoc coalitions can be more effective in carrying out immediate
aims (the capitulation of Milosevic, ousting of the Hussein regime) because those interventions take place under unified command structures
among states that already cooperate militarily. Similarly, the INTERFET
operation in East Timor was, for all purposes, an Australian military
operation.
The U.N., however, has capacity and competence in other areas, particularly assessment, sanctions and post-conflict peacekeeping, policing
and administration. 3 16 This suggests that even where agreement on the
rules governing military intervention may be difficult to reach, efforts
should be made to improve and strengthen these functions at the U.N.
313. This sense of legitimacy can be evidenced in public statements made by
Germany and France following the election.
314. The U.N. has recently recognized this issue. SeeA MORE SECURE WORLD:
OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND

CHANGE (2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.

pdf.
315. For a discussion of a military committee, see supra notes 34 and 119.
316. A recent quantitative study by RAND concluded that the U.N. is, in fact,
better at post-conflict civil administration (or "state building") than the United

States.
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Iraq demonstrates, for example, that sustained oversight by the Council of
inspections and assessment regimes can result in relatively accurate factfinding.3 17 In East Timor, the U.N. was extraordinarily successful at assessing human rights violations, humanitarian needs and the modalities for
carrying out the election. Kosovo demonstrates that, when an effective
regional organization has the capacity to act in assessing threats, the U.N.
can usefully piggy-back on those efforts. Sanctions against Iraq were more
or less effective in shutting down certain military capacity. The same can
be said in Kosovo, although there, the embargoes had the effect of locking
in disparities of military capacity between the parties.
In post-conflict administration, the U.N. has done well in securing
initial transitions to peace (East Timor and Kosovo), in supporting reconstruction of civil society (East Timor and Kosovo) and in running elections
(East Timor, Kosovo and a supporting role in Iraq). One reason why the
U.N. may be better at post-conflict civil operations than an ad hoc coalition is rooted in both operational capacity and the legitimacy rationale;
those affected by war see the U.N., more or less, as a neutral actor in the
3 18

reconstruction process.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The taxonomy assists in understanding and analyzing the functions of
multilateralism in war and demonstrates that the functions through which
the U.N. organization works in support of that aggregated legal mandate

are dispersed and carried out by many bodies. It therefore presents a way
to overcome the problem of over-inclusiveness of data and over-ascription
of causation and sets out a framework for comparative empirical examination of multilateralism in armed conflicts. International lawyers can benefit from deeper engagement with empirical work that assesses the relative
competencies of institutions and actors (unilateral and multilateral)
within each of the functions. In that regard, this study is intended to raise
observations that can serve as testable hypotheses. It also raises additional
questions. How, for example, have the institutional functions represented
in the taxonomy been carried out in different types of conflicts, e.g., wars
of secession, civil conflict and wars of independence? How can the taxonomy be used in the context of non-state threats to international peace and
security, e.g., terrorism and organized crime?
The place to start answering these and other questions is through a
function-by-function examination, done against the backdrop of the centrality of legal and normative authority of the Council. From the point of
view of reforming the rules and laws of the security multilateralism, em317. Additional research on the rules and processes governing intelligence
collection and cooperation would be useful in this regard.
318. See Dobbins, supra note 316, at xxx (noting that U.N. "has an ability to
compensate, to some degree at least, for its 'hard' power deficit with 'soft' power
attributes of international legitimacy and local impartiality," whereas United States
does not have those advantages when it carries out military mandates).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss1/12
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phasis in future research should be on how, precisely, each of the functions performs against the measure of preventing or shortening wars. In
the areas I have identified where the Council's aggregated authority and
ability to marshal diverse actors within the U.N.-assessment, sanctions
and post-conflict civil administration-future studies aimed at analyzing
these functions across a larger set of cases would be useful in identifying
problems with either the norms or practice of the U.N.
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